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RECENT DECISIONS
ESTATE TAX - TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY AND JOINT TENANTS - INTER
Vivos TRANSFER WITH RETAINED LIFE ESTATE. - Decedent and his wife owned
five separate parcels of real estate as tenants by the entireties, and another parcel
with a daughter as joint tenants. The entire consideration for these properties
was furnished by the decedent. In 1943 and in 1946, the decedent and his wife
conveyed the parcels held by them as tenants by the entireties, to their children,
reserving in themselves life estates with remainders to the survivors of them. They
received no consideration in return for these conveyances. In 1945, the parcel of
real estate owned by them with their daughter as joint tenants, was similarly
conveyed to another child; the daughter did not join in this conveyance. In
determining how much of the value of these properties should be included in
decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes, the District Director of Internal
Revenue included the full value of all the properties, less the value of the life
estate of the widow in one-half thereof. In an action to recover estate taxes alleged
to have been erroneously assessed against and collected from the estate of plaintifts
decedent, held, that only one-half of the value of the entirety properties, transferred
by the decedent and his wife, should be included in decedent's gross estate; only
one-third of the value of the joint property, transferred by the decedent and his
wife, should be included in decedent's gross estate. Glaser v. United States, 196
F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
The Government contended that two provisions1 of the Internal Revenue Code
should be read together, one provision requiring inclusion in the gross estate, for
tax purposes, of property jointly held by the decedent and others and the other
provision requiring the inclusion of property transferred for no consideration and
with the retention of a life estate. The court concluded that only the latter provision
is applicable, and confined itself to property law. Since the conveyances by the
decedent and his wife destroyed the tenancies, decedent was left with only an
interest in one-half of the property. Since he retained a life estate in that one-half,
that interest is includable in his estate for the purposes of estate taxation.
In this comment, consideration will be given first to the requirement that
property held by the decedent as a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety be included
in his estate for taxation purposes. Taxes of this sort, i.e., death duties or excises
imposed upon the occasion of change in legal relationships to property brought
about by death are ancient in origin.2 Such taxes were known to the Roman law
and the ancient law of the continent of Europe.s Having survived the test of
constitutionality, 4 they are now firmly imbedded in the United States Internal
Revenue Code.5 Disregarding for the present, the transfer of the properties by
decedent and his wife, the application to decedent's estate of the reasoning which
1 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2040; INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036.
2 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,47 (1899).
3 SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 311 (London ed. 1811).
4 O'Shaughnessy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1932);
Robinson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 63 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1933). Sections of
the Internal Revenue Code requiring inclusion in gross estate for tax purposes, of value of
property held by tenants by the entirety are not unconstitutional.
5 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2040.
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
(except real property situated outside of the United States) to the extent
of the interest therein held as joint tenants by the decedent and any other
person, or as tenants by the entirety by the decedent and spouse, or
deposited, with any person carrying on the banking business, in their joint
names and payable to either or the survivor, except such part thereof as
may be shown to have originally belonged to such other person and never
to have been received or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less
than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
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lies behind the justification for these taxes would result in the inclusion, for purposes
of taxation, of the entire value of the properties in question.6 An argument to the
contrary was advanced by the court which decided the case of Bowers v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue.7 That court held that the tax should be based
upon, and limited to, the increase in the value of the estate of the surviving tenant
through the death of the other. It stated:
Under no theory can it be said that the husband's interest in the property
at the time of his death was the full value of the real estate. Equally clear is
the conclusion that the wife, who already owned part of the fee, could not
have the value of her interest increased by the full value of the real estate by
becoming the owner of the balance of the fee upon the death of her
husband.8
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, however, the decision was
reversed.9 The reasons behind the reversal are found in the earlier case of Tyler
v. United States' wherein the court said:
Before the death of the husband the wife had the right to possess and use
the whole property, but so, also, had her husband; she could not dispose
of the property except with her husband's concurrence; her rights were
hedged about at all points by the equal rights of her husband. At his death,
however, and because of it, she for the first time, became entitled to exclu-
sive possession, use, and enjoyment .... These circumstances, together with
the fact, the existence of which the statute requires, that no part of the
property originally had belonged to the wife, are sufficient, in our opinion,
to make valid the inclusion of the property in the gross estate which forms
the primary base for the measurement of the tax.
It would seem that the principal factor permitting Congress to so tax an
estate is that the death of one tenant by the entirety, since it frees the property
from his rights in it, is the generating source of important and definite accessions
to the property rights of the other." It is the indispensable and intended event
which brings the larger estate into being for the grantee and effects its transmission
from the dead to the living.12 There is, at death, a distinct shifting of economic
interest, a decided change for the survivor's benefit; and this termination of a
joint tenancy or tenancy by the entireties marked by a change in the nature of
ownership of property was designated by Congress as an appropriate occasion for
the imposition of a tax' 3 ; and, while state law creates legal interests and rights,
it is the federal law which designates which of these interests and rights shall be
taxed.'
4
It is important to note that in determining the value of an estate for purposes
of taxation, no distinction is made between property held by joint tenants and
that held by tenants by the entireties. As expressed by one court:
There is sufficient substantial similarity between joint tenancies and ten-
ancies by the entirety to have moved Congress to treat them alike for
purposes of taxation. Practical necessities-and taxation is "eminently
practical"- may well have led Congress to group different types of joint
ownership together for taxation rather than to afford different treatment
to each varying shade of such ownership.' 5
Attention is now directed to the second requir6ment that property transferred
for no consideration and with the retention of a life estate be included in the estate
of the deceased grantor for purposes of taxation.
6 Lindsey v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 136 (D. Md. 1958).
7 90 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1937); reversed, 303 U.S. 618 (1939).
8 Bowers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra note 7 at 791.
9 Bowers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 303 U.S. 618 (1939)-.
10 281 U.S. 497,503,504 (1930).
11 Third Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Springfield v. White, 45 F.2d 911 (D. Mass. 1930).
12 Klein v. United States, 283 U.S.'231 (1931).
13 United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1938); Fairclaw v. Forrest, 130 F.2d 829
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
14 Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154,162 (1942); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S.
78,80-81 (1940).
15 United States v. Jacobs, 306"U.S. 363,370 (1938).
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This provision appeared in the Revenue Act of 1926,", which required the
inclusion in one's estate, for estate tax purposes, of property of which he had
made a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his
death. The taxing authorities interpreted this phrase to include a transfer wherein
the transferor reserved to himself the benefits of the property; however, the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed this interpretation in the case of May v.
Heiner" and held that property which the decedent had conveyed irrevocably, but
in which he had retained a life interest was not taxable to his estate. Subsequently,
on March 2, 1931, three per curiam decisions to the same effect as May v. Heiner
were issued by the same court."' On the next day Congress passed a joint reso-
lution 9 which expressly stated that property transferred, but with a life estate
reserved to the donor, was taxable to his estate.
The law, then, was based on the decision of May v. Heiner as to pre-1931
transactions, and on the 1931 joint resolution as to post-1931 transactions until
the Supreme Court's decision in 1949 in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Estate of Church,20 which overruled May v. Heiner. The Church decision has been
interpreted to mean that even in the simple case of a life estate and an irrevocable
remainder, the law was that the property was subject to the estate tax.2 1
Speaking of the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, and of the Church decision,
the court in the case of McNichol's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue22
stated:
This resolution redefined the phrase "intended to take effect in possession
and enjoyment at or after his death," so that it would include a transfer
under which the transferor retained for his life . . . the possession or enjoy-
ment of, or the income from, the transferred property. ... By this resolution
Congress rejected the view of May v. Heiner and its progeny that estate tax
includabiity depended upon whether or not the title had technically
passed....
The Church opinion emphasizes that the criterion for determining
whether property transferred inter vivos is subject to a death tax is the
effect of the transfer, and states that whenever in fact the ultimate possession
or enjoyment of property is held in suspense until the death of the transferor,
the property -is swept into the decedent's gross estate by the statute. Sub-
stance and not form is made the touchstone of taxability.
The intent of Congress as shown by the Joint Resolution and interpreted in
the Church case is reflected in the present wording of Section 2036 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954."3 And, while it is true that an ingenius mind may devise
many means of avoiding an inheritance tax, still the one commonly used was a
16 Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 70.
17 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
18 Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931); Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S.
783 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931).
19 Chap. 454, 71 Cong., 3rd Sess., 46 Stat. 1516 (1931);
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, that the first sentence of sub-
division (c) of section 302 of the Revenue Act of 1926 is amended to read
as follows:(c) to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of or intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, including
a transfer under which the transferor has retained for his life or any period
not ending before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the
income from, the property or (2) the right to designate the persons who
shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom; except in case
of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth.
20 33 U.S. 632, (1949).
21 Smith v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 305 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
22 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
23 IT. RZv. COD . of 1954, § 2036.
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transfer with reservation of a life estate.24 Thus, viewing the actions of Congress,
it can safely be surmised that this is the avoidance meant to be eliminated. And
it would seem that the amount of interest retained in the transferred property does
not have to be large in order for it to be included in the estate of the transferor.
It is enough if he retains some contingent interest in the property until his death,
delaying until then the ripening of full dominion over the property by the bene-
ficiaries.25
It seems clear that Congress intended that the estate tax, i.e., an excise tax
upon the privilege of transmitting property by reason of death,26 should not be
avoided by a transfer of property for no consideration (and, probably in the vast
majority of cases, to the person who would have received the property upon the
death of the transferor) with a retention of the enjoyment of the property. And
Congress has also provided that the privilege of passing to the survivor of a joint
estate, an unimpeded title to the property, should also be taxed to the estate of
the decedent. However, in its attempt to tax the properties involved in such trans-
actions, it appears that Congress has failed to forsee and provide for the situation
existing in the present case, even though, as conceded by the court, the type of
transaction involved 'here could easily be used by a taxpayer in an attempt to avoid
estate taxes.
Be that as it may, it is not hard to find justification for the decision. If it be
true that a conveyance by tenants by the entireties and joint tenants, with a reser-
vation of a life estate, destroys the tenancies, then it seems logical to conclude that
no joint interests exist to which Section 2040 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
can be applied. Although this seems to be a reasonable solution to the problem
at hand, there are still problems which could arise in the future as a result of this
decision.
Since, under this decision, the estate is taxed on one-half and one-third the
value of the properties, it seems safe to assume that this interest is considered as
descending upon either the wife or the grantees. If it is considered as descending
upon the wife, then it would seem that this would merge with her existing interest.
She would then 'hold the entire interest, i.e., the only life estate in the properties.
Her death would seem to be the proper occasion for the application of Section
2036 of the Internal Revenue Code and the entire value of the properties would
presumably be taxable to her estate. Query; would this not result in double taxation
of that interest in the property originally included in the estate of the deceased
husband?
Further, since an estate tax is a tax upon the privilege of passing property
at death, it would seem, under the present decision, that the decedent is deemed
to have left one-half and one-third of the value of the properties in question.
However, since the wife receives only that which she already had, i.e., a life estate,
and since the grantees still hold the property subject to her life estate, it is sub-
mitted that no bne has in fact been materially benefited. The question then arises
whether any part of the value of these properties should be taxable to the estate
of the decedent.
Another problem which will most certainly arise is that of the proper allow-
ance for the marital deduction which is the deduction allowed from the gross estate
of a married person for property passing to his or her spouse.2 7 Since the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 in Section 2056(b) has explicit provisions denying the
marital deduction for property passed to the wife which will not be part of her
24 In the Matter of Keeney, 194 N.Y. 281, 87 N.E. 428 (1909); aff'd, 222 U.S. 525(1912).
25 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108 (1944).
26 BLAcx, LAW DICTIONARY 647 (4th ed. 1951).
27 2 BEVERIDGE, FEDERAL EsTATE TAXATION § 14.01 (1956).
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taxable estate at her death, the resolution of the questions posed above is very
important.
Mindful of the goals of Congress in this area, it is submitted that it could be
found, since the entire original consideration was furnished by the decedent, that
the conveyance by him and his wife did not so divest him of the enjoyment, either
present or future, of the entire property so as to relieve his estate of any part of
the entire value of the properties, but left him with a life estate in the other half,
which might be termed a "secondary" life estate. In-spite of the conveyance, there
still existed the possibility that the wife would precede the decedent in death. If
this were to happen, the decedent would have had the only life estate in the
property; would have received no consideration for the transfer of the property;
and would presumably have his estate subjected to the provisions of Section 2036
of the Internal Revenue Code .2  It seems that, since it is this retention of enjoy-
ment or attachment of a "string" to the benefits of transferred property which
Congress has intended should render that property subject to estate taxation, it
would not be unreasonable to conclude that the entire value of the "transferred"
property in the instant case should be included in the estate of the decedent.
It is submitted, further, that it might be found that the conveyance of property
by tenants by the entireties or joint tenants, reserving in themselves29 life estates,
did not result in the destruction of the tenancy but merely a continuation of it
in a different form, i.e., life estate. It could therefore be concluded that, since their
transfer began and ended in harmony, they have acted as one, and are subject
to the provisions of Section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code just as an individual
is so subjected.
The decision is a reasonable one. However, courts have held, in cases involving
individuals, that a transaction which might be a legally valid transfer or gift for
most purposes, can, under certain circumstances, be treated, for the purposes of
estate taxation, as though it had never been transferred at all. Since this has been
done with the cases which have dealt with individuals, it would seem that the
same construction could be placed upon a transfer by persons owning property as
joint tenants or tenants by the entireties.
Robert E. Veverka
INSURANCE - TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS - TOTAL DisABiLrrY is NECES-
SARiLY RELATIVE, AND MUST BE DETERMINED ON THE FACTS OF EACH CASE -
Plaintiff brought suit to recover benefits provided for in an insurance policy' issued
to him by the defendant. He testified that he had been a carpenter or a construc-
28 It is important, in order to avoid this problem of double taxation, that Section 2036
be interpreted as not applicable to a situation wherein the consideration was furnished in
its entirety by the survivor of the joint interest.
29 In the instant case, the decedent and his wife reserved the life estates in themselves
and in the survivor of them. This would seem to add support to the theory that the transfer
was considered by them to be done in unison; it would also seem to render more feasible
the submission that the tenancy was not destroyed but merely continued in a different form.
1 Disability Before Age 60: Waiver of Premiums-Payment of Insurance in
Monthly Installments- If the Insured shall become totally disabled, either
physically or mentally, from any cause whatsoever, to such an extent that he
(or she) is rendered wholly, continuously permanently unable to engage in
any occupation or perform any work for any kind of compensation or finan-
cial value during the remainder of his (or her) lifetime, and if such dis-
ability shall occur at any time after the payment of the first premium on this
Policy, while this Policy is in full force and effect and the insured is less
than sixty years of age, and before any nonforfeiture provision shall become
operative, the Company, upon receipt of due proof of such disability, will
grant the following benefits.
Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America v. Tate, 344 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
(Emphasis added.)
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tion superintendent all of his active working days and that he was no longer able
to do either kind of work. He became sixty years of age on August 27, 1955, but
was disabled prior to that time. He did not become aware of the total disability
provision until May 1957, at which time he filed a claim for his loss.
He testified that he could perform the duties of a timekeeper but that he did
not know how to type. He could neither walk nor stand for a very long period
of time" and he did not believe that his physical condition would permit him to hold
a timekeeper's job. He also thought he might be able to perform the duties of a
construction material salesman, but he had never had any experience as a salesman,
and knew of no jobs in such occupation. The trial court overruled defendant's
motion for an instructed verdict, and also refused to submit to the jury the question
of whether the plaintiff was able to perform these occupations. The jury found for
the plaintiff, and judgment was entered in the amount of $3276.64.
The defendant appealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals which affirmed.
The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas on the ground, inter
alia, that it was error for the trial court- to overrule petitioner's motion for an in-
structed verdict because respondent admitted on cross-examination that he was able
to perform the duties of (1) a timekeeper and (2) an effective salesman of con-
struction material. Held: affirmed.2 "A total disability clause in an insurance policy
should be reasonably construed. Total disability is necessarily a relative matter, and
must depend chiefly on the peculiar circumstances of each case and on the nature
of the occupation or employment and the capabilities of the person injured. We
do not believe it was within the contemplation of the parties that the insured should
educate himself, or go through apprenticeship for another occupation, and, per-
chance, be able to do some occupation, and thereby relieve the Insurance Company
from the obligations of its contract." Prudential Life Insurance'Co. v. Tate, 347
S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1961)
A literal intei-pretation of the disability provision in this case s would seem to
require that the plaintiff must be unable to transact any kind of business whatso-
ever, in order to recover under the terms of the policy. However, the Texas court
stated that a total disability clause should be reasonably construed. 4 The court
further cited Cooley's Briefs on Insurance:5
Total disability is necessarily a relative matter, and must depend chiefly
on the peculiar circumstances of each case and on the nature of the occupa-
fion or employment and the capabilities of the person injured. It does not
--mean absolute physical disability of the insured to transact any kind of
business pertaining to his occupation, but exists if he is unable to do any
substantial portion of the work connected therewith.
The .decision in the Tate case6 is in accord with the majority7 of jurisdictions
which follow a so-called liberal rule of construction, when interpreting disability
2 The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, however, on the ground that an improper stand-
ard was used to calculate damages.
3 Prudential Life Insurance Co. v. Tate, supra note 1.
4 It is true that, by applying the strict letter of the contract, the evidence does not dis-
close a total disability as would prevent him from performing any and all duties incident to the
practice of his profession; but I think the clause should be reasonably construed, and, so con-
struing the same, he has become totally disabled. Hefner v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York, 110 Tex. 606, 160 S.W. 330, 334, 222 S.W. 966 (1913).
5 6 COOLIL's Brua.s ON INSURANCE 5539 (2nd ed. 1928).
6 Prudential Life Insurance Co. v. Tate, supra note 1.
7 Nearly all the decisions agree, either expressly or by necessary implication, that a clause
in an accident policy or in a life policy providing for payment of indemnity in case the in-
sured is totally or wholly disabled from engaging in any occupation or employment for wage
or profit will not be construed, as a literal construction would require, as meaning a state of
absolute inability to carry on any vocation whatever, but will be given a broader interpreta-
tion in favor of the insured in accordance with the so-called liberal rule of construction. This
rule is so general and well settled that it is needless to cite authorities for it. See Annot., 149
A.L.R. 7-189 (1944).
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provisions in similar situations. These courts broadly interpret such provisions in
favor of the insured."
The stipulation that, before liability attaches, the insured shall be disabled
"from pursuing any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or profit" is
an undue restriction on the contract and evidently not within the contempla-
tion of the parties.9
In Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Neill,20 the plaintiff
was a dentist. He had been disabled in 1932 and the defendant paid disability
benefits from that time until 1951. In 1951, the defendant denied liability under
the policy on the ground that the plaintiff was no longer disabled. The plaintiff
had invested in a business which sold laundry equipment. He had no specific
duties to perform and received no remuneration until he sold his stock in the
company. The court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff and stated:
The oft-repeated Florida statement that under a policy definition that
total and permanent disability exists when the insured is prevented from
doing any work, does not mean that [the] insured must be bedridden or
reduced to [a] condition of complete helplessness."
In Huffman v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 2 an employee of a copper
mining company contracted silicosis. He was denied recovery under a total dis-
ability provision similar to that involved in the Tate case.' 3 There was conflicting
expert -testimony as to whether the insured was able to perform manual labor,
and whether he was totally disabled. There was also evidence that the insured
had been working as an automobile salesman since his alleged total disability.
The trial court entered judgment for the insured and the court of appeals af-
firmed. The Supreme Court of Tennessee, when it reversed and dismissed the
case, set out two rules as conditions of recovery under a total disability provision:
First, as a condition of recovery, it must appear that the insured is in-
capacitated to earn, not only in his chosen or previously formed occupation,
but in any other to which he may be reasonaly fitted.
Second, to defeat recovery on the ground of earning capacity, it must
appear that the remaining capacity to earn, despite disability, is a capacity
to earn substantially. No scintilla rule applies. The earning capacity remain-
ing must bear some reasonable relation to the natural or previous capacity
to earn, against loss of which it is the purpose of the policy contract to
insure.
The conditions of recovery as defined in the Huffman case, provide at least
some reasonable criteria for determining when a person is totally disabled. But
even these standards are not adequate, because they are not sufficiently compre-
hensive to be applied to the multitude of different disability provisions in existence
today. Appleman states that:
In general, total disability is not considered to exist if the insured can
follow any remunerative occupation, whether his present vocation or another,
especially where a general type of clause is used as that just indicated "so as
to be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation and performing
any work for compensation or profit." This rule is not applied, however,
without qualification. In construing what constitutes total disability, the
courts have held that the insured can only be expected to follow occupa-
tions for which his age, health, training, and experience have fitted him and
for which he is reasonably qualified.14
The decision in the instant case does not go far enough toward eliminating
uncertainty in the interpretation of such provisions. The court did not indicate
what a claimant must prove in order to show that he is totally disabled. The court
8 Ibid.
9 Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Cuffman, 127 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939).
10 243 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1957).
11 Ibid.
12 241 S.W.2d 536 (Tenn. 1951).
13 Compare Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America v. Tate, supra note 1, with Huffman
v Equitable Life Assurance Society, 241 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Tenn. 1951).
14 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 681 (1941).
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did not do so because the provision which it considered, was drafted 'in such a
manner as to preclude a literal interpretation, and was therefore "reasonably con-
strued."1
If the contract had been clear and unambiguous it would not have been
necessary to construe the provision so as to favor either party. The provision could
have been literally construed, and the case would have been decided solely on
the basis of its facts considered in reference to the explicit terms of the policy.
It has been stated that:
Where there is no ambiguity in the terms of the contract or the tests laid
down by it, neither party will be favored in its construction. Thus, the
courts will not construe two entirely dissimilar expressions to have the same
meaning. If the contract refers to "engaging in any occupation or employ-
ment for wage or profit," it necessarily does not mean the same as "perform-
ing any and every kind of duty pertaining to the insured's employment." One
is general, the other limited- the latter pertaining only to the occupation
which the insured is following at the time of the injury. Thus it would be
error for the court to permit the jury to consider only the question as to
whether the insured, after injury, could follow his present vocation under
the general type of clause.16
The disability benefit has been referred to as "the actuary's mistake." 17 It
would be equally correct to say that the disability benefit provision in its present
form is also the draftman's mistake, because it appears that it is the sort of clause
the courts simply will not enforce.
To define the insured event is often the most difficult and important task
of the draftsman of insurance contracts. If it is defined too narrowly, the
contract will fail to give the insured the protection that he desires. Arbi-
trary limitations are likely to arouse the hostility of courts, who may construe
them to mean something quite different from what the insurer had in mind.
On the other hand, if the insured event is broadly or loosely defined, the
court, construing it most favorably to the insured, in accord with the well-
established rule, will make it include cases that the insurer did not intend
to include when it fixed the premium for the policy. 8
The difficulties of drafting a total disability provision which would be capable
of being literally interpreted, without prejudicing the insuror or the insured, does
not appear to be an impossibility. The Tennessee Court 9 has established a criterion
for determining when a person is totally disabled. The court in the Tate case20
has established to some extent a criteria from which a determination can be made
as to whether a person is totally disabled.
It is submitted that a just result was reached in the Tate case, and is probably
reached in the great majority of cases involving a total disability clause. However,
the failure to provide the criteria discussed above does leave open the possibility
that these provisions will be variously construed. In view of this fact insurance
companies would be well advised to attempt to draft provisions which would allow
such cases ito be determined solely on the basis of their facts, at the trial level,
and with a minimum of uncertainty as to what is meant by the term "totally
disabled."
John W. Dell
RAL PROPERTY - LITTORAL LAND OwNBRs- LAND CREATED By COMMON-
WEALTH By PUMPING SAND FROM HARBOR AND DEPOSITING IT IN FRONT OF
LrrroaAL OWNER'S SEAWALL Is PROPERTY OF LrrroRAL OWNER. -The three
plaintiffs own contiguous lots facing and bounded by Wild Harbor on the West.
A seawall separates land from sea so that at high tide the water merely rises in
15 Hefner v. Fidelity & Casualty of New York supra note 4.
16 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 681 (1941).
17 LIFE INSURANCE TRENDS & PROBLEMS (1943).
18 PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 240 (1957).
19 241 S.W.2d 536. It may be that these criteria, if followed by the draftsman, will pro-
duce the strictest clause enforceable.
20 Prudential Life Insurance Co. v. Tate, supra note 1.
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height against the wall. In the Spring of 1950 the Massachusetts Department of
Public Works undertook a dredging operation and deposited sand against the
seawall, creating a beach on the harbor side of the seawall. Jetties were constructed
to protect the newly formed beach. Defendant association's members began using
this area for usual beach purposes and installed a loud speaker system, primarily
to assist the lifeguards on the shore. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the
use of the public address system, and an injunction against use of the beach, as
well as a declaration of their unencumbered rights to the newly created beach
area. The lower court dismissed the bill on grounds that the Commonwealth's
actions dedicated the area to a public use. On appeal to the Supreme Judicial
Court, held: reversed. Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 178 N.E.2d
273 (1961).
The court stated the principal question to be "whether a beach created as
was this one belongs to the littoral owners or to the Commonwealth."' Finding
for the littoral owners would necessitate holding that a direct and unnatural crea-
tion of land in front of their property vests title in the owners, while deciding for
the public requires a decision that the beach was created appurtenant to the
Commonwealth's reserved power to control navigation. After analyzing the cases
relied upon in the lower court, the decision was reversed on a finding that the
creation of the new beach was more like natural accretion than part of a naviga-
tion project.
The court admitted that the problem posed by this case is unique in Massa-
chusetts, and attempted to couch its findings in terms of existing Massachusetts
water law. The United States Supreme Court has held that state law governs
its decision in water cases.2 At common law the title to the bed of the sea below
high water mark was in the Crown.' However, in Massachusetts, the Colonial
Ordinance of 1641-47 settled the common law as extending private ownership
along tide waters to "the low water mark where the sea doth not ebb above a
hundred rods, and not more wheresoever it ebbs further."14 The public rights to
navigation, fishing and fowling, however, are reserved in the state.' The result is
that Massachusetts owns all the land below this line, and enjoys a reserved right
above this line, limited to the mentioned public uses. Generally speaking, in the
following discussion it makes little difference whether the Colonial Ordinance's
low water mark is the property line, whether the high water mark is the line, or
even whether any intermediate line has been statutized. The various states recognize
one of these lines. The theory herein is equally applicable to all.
Taking first the public dedication theory, the crucial question posed is whether
the formation was a natural, if not necessary, incident to the harbor dredging.
This question was answered affirmatively in Home for Aged Women v. Common-
wealth,6 by a showing that the construction of the dam and the filling of a strip
of land outside the seawall along the Charles River were treated by the legislature
as parts of a single project for the public good. The Massachusetts court used
the words "natural, if not necessary incident of the change of the water level"7
when -describing the relationship between navigation and the built up area. In the
instant case the department of public works was not shown to have explicitly
required the creation of beaches and the construction of jetties to be a necessary
part of the harbor deepening project. If the beaches were declared necessary to
navigation, the littoral owners would have no title in them under the then existing
1 Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Association, Inc., 178 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Mass.
1961).
2 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
3 Barker v. Bates, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 255 (1832).
4 Butler v. Attorney General, 195 Mass. 79, 80 N.E. 688 (1907).
5 Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 89 N.E. 124 (1909).
6 Ibid.
7 Id. at 436, 89 N.E. 124, 129.
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Massachusetts law as expressed in Home for Aged Women." Rather, there is
silence on the matter. It thus remained necessary for the court to determine
whether the beaches are so closely related to the public right of navigation as to
be a part of it.
The lower court found as a matter of fact that the formation of the beaches
was so related, and resulted in a dedication of the new land to the public use.
When the state embarks on a dredging project it is natural and necessary to
deposit the removed sand somewhere. Any dredging can also be said -to improve
navigation to some degree. Logically then, the deposit of sand incident to dredging
is natural and necessary. The real problem is whether the depositing of sand along
the plaintiffs' shoreline was a natural and necessary incident of the dredging. In
Home for Aged Women, the fill outside the seawall was specifically intended as
part of the comprehensive project. The fill was necessary to raise the water level
for navigation, and landscaping the built up area for a park dedicated it to the
public use. In the instant case this intent factor is completely absent. The disposal
of the sand along adjacent shores seems to have been a matter of convenience
rather than an intentional building up of the beach for some related navigational
purpose. It is not apparent that the beach provided any needed access to the
water for navigational purposes, nor is it indicated that the extended shoreline
protects the navigability of the harbor. Thus, it was relatively easy to justify
reversing the lower court's finding of fact. Implicit in this finding is the court's
deduction that the jetty project was separate and distinct from the navigational
project. The very fact of the construction might be some indication of legislative
intent, but there is no showing that this improvement had a direct and continuing
connection with navigation. The littoral owner's rights can only be defeated by
the state for a public use under one of its reserved powers.9 Legislative intent to
make the beach a necessary part of the navigation project is missing, as are facts
upon which to judicially construct intent. The instant court reaches this conclu-
sion when it inquires whether the navigational dredging project would be substan-
tially impaired without the creation of the beaches and construction of the jetties.
Home for Aged Women would produce an affirmative reply. Speaking of Silver
Beach though, the court concluded that under the undisputed facts it is clear that
the creation of the beach was by no means necessary for the enjoyment of naviga-
tion in the deeper channel.10
One possible argument seems to have been overlooked. A New York case
has held that submerged lands have the same general incidents, as property, as
other real property.1 There the question concerned a trespass. Here though, it
could be recognized that the removal of soil from one part of land to another
portion of the same owner's land is a lawful use of real property, so long as a
nuisance is not created. The main element of a nuisance is to so use your land
as to not hinder the free use of a neighbor's property.1 2 The formation of the
beach does not per se create a nuisance so long as the basic rights of the littoral
owner are preserved. The right of access has been said to be the fundamental
riparian right on which all others depend.' This right can be protected by an
easement without granting title to the land. The right of access is one only for
navigation or other lawful purposes, and is not necessarily an exclusive right of
the littoral owner. The result of such an argument would be that defendants and
the general public would be entitled to the reasonable use of the beach. Plaintiffs
would be considered part of the general public. If the lands were considered
8 Ibid.
9 Adams v. Frothingham, 3 Mass. 352 (1807).
10 Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Association, Inc., supra note 1 at 277.
11 White v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 254 N.Y. 152, 172 N.E. 452 (1930).
12 PROSSER ON TORTS 405 (2nd ed. 1955).
13 State v. Knowles-Lombard Co., 122 Conn. 263, 188 A. 275 (1936).
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to be a reclamation by the state, the case of Richardson v. City of Boston'4 would
interject a pertinent point. There Boston's construction of a street on flats owned
by the city caused debris to hamper the access of ships to plaintiffs wharves. The
court held plaintiff's damage to be "damnun absque iniuria" because the use was
lawful. In the Silver Beach case the transfer of sand from the channel to a spot
nearer the shore could also be a lawful, or at least not an unlawful, use of the
state land. If so, the littoral owner would have no legal complaint.
Proceeding to the accretion theory, the framework of existing Massachusetts
water law indicates an insignificant difference between natural accretions and
unnatural additions to the littoral owner's land. One exception is that the owner
himself cannot cause an extension of his land without permission from the state.'5
In Burke v. Commonwealth'6 the court said that when the accretion is natural,
the line of ownership follows the changing water line. The reason for such a rule
is that an owner takes the property with notice that the forces of nature may work
upon the land to his benefit or burden. Additionally, there is a legislative and
judicial desire that all land should be owned by someone?7 Thus, the general
rule is that littoral owners have title to the appropriate sea mark, much like the
owner of an orchard has title to the fruits.
Prior to the last few decades and the invention of highly efficient dredging
equipment, most of the so-called artificial changes along water lines have occurred
through a combination of artificial and natural causes. The common situation
involves the construction of an obstruction, leading to a build-up of silt or alluvion
in a position where it would not have formed absent the obstruction. Courts have
labelled this an artificial accretion.
Massachusetts considers such a function an unnatural accretion, yet holds
these accumulations legally vested in the littoral owner -even though not due
entirely to natural causes.' In Burke v. Commonwealth9 a breakwater was con-
structed to protect a harbor entrance channel. Sand built up behind this structure
in the course of time, exposing subsurface flats belonging to the state. The court
there equated the build-up of beach land behind the breakwater to natural accre-
tion, and declared the title to be in the littoral owner. In applying that case to
the one at hand, the Massachusetts court here simply said that "we see no reason
why the fact that the land created as here, by dredging should require a different
result."2 0
True, there may be no difference necessitating a contrary result in this case,
but for purposes of bringing the law into sharper focus it is submitted that a dis-
tinction should be made. Earlier it was mentioned that modem dredging equip-
ment and techniques have made purely unnatural accretions more commonplace.
It can reasonably be expected that the economical and convenient nature of water
transportation will at least continue the present need for clearing old channels,
if not require significant increases in dredging activity to create new waterways.
Such activity is undertaken for the most part by the federal government and the
states. Because of the rather blunt equating of natural and artificial accretions in
older decisions, further problems will arise when a closer examination is accorded
the professed identity between natural and purely unnatural accretions. The
Silver Beach case deals with a purely artificial accretion. There is here really no
working of natural forces to create the beach area; it is formed solely through
14 Richardson v. City of Boston, 19 S. Ct. (How.) 263, 15 L.Ed. 639 (1856).
15 Saunders v. New York Central & Hartford R.R. Co., 144 N.Y. 75, 38 N.E. 992
(1894).
16 Burke v. Commonwealth, 283 Mass. 63, 186 N.E. 277 (1933).
17 Adams v. Frothingham, supra note 9.
18 Burke v. Commonwealth, supra note 16.
19 Ibid.
20 Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Association, Inc., supra note 1 at 278.
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human efforts. The legal declaration that ownership is in the littoral proprietor
should have been stated as being based on the principle that wholly artificial
deposits of alluvion along the shoreline belong to the littoral owner, subject only
to the paramount rights of the United States and the Commonwealth in aid of
navigation, fishing and fowling. Furthermore, the test to be applied when de-
termining whether a project is incident to this reserved power should be the
"direct and continuing relation" query used by the court herein.21
The Alabama Supreme Court was faced with a problem similar to the present
one and referred to the artificial build up as "streamlined accretion, or perhaps
a reclamation. '22 The instant case should not be viewed as dealing with a reclama-
tion since the same intent problem which arose in connecting the dredging and
the beach projects again presents itself. There was no showing of any intent to
reclaim submerged lands, merely an intent to effect a deeper harbor channel as
a primary purpose. The use of the suggested classification would permit a more
accurate understanding of the basic legal ideas existent in the area today.
Natural accretions would continue to vest title absolutely in the littoral owner.
Even though the current law in Massachusetts and most other states treats artificial
formations of the Burke v. Commonwealth23 variety as natural accretions, the
developing case law should recognize at least the possibility of a difference.
Even more so should a distinction be made between natural accretions and
land formations resulting more or less indirectly from some lawful navigational
project. Case law appears to be just developing in this area. It seems that both
the Silver Beach and State v. Gill24 cases reached a just result. However, in future
cases the relationship between the lawful project and the secondary project may
be more pronounced than here. In such cases the court could reach an opposite
result without applying the aforementioned test and considerably cloud this newly
defined area of the law, simply because the problem was not viewed in the proper
perspective.
It is expected that with an increased awareness of the problem the state
law-making body will be more careful to express its actions 'in accord with the
reserved power to control navigation that it possesses. Similarly, the legislature
could enact a comprehensive act pronouncing that all accretions, artificial or
otherwise, not caused by the littoral or riparian owner, belong to said owner unless
the state exercises its rights to use the land for lawful purposes of navigation,
fishing or fowling.
James A. Wysocki
REAL PROPERTY - TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY - JOINT TENANCY - DEED PUR-
PORTING TO CONVEY PROPERTY BY THE ENTIRETIES TO MAN AND WOMAN NOT
LEGALLY MARRIED CREATED A JOINT TENANCY. - Decedent and one Alice lived
together in the District of Columbia, ostensibly as man and wife, for a period of
more than thirty years. In fact, however, they had never been married, and de-
cedent had a legal spouse, Susie, by virtue of a 1903 ceremonial marriage which
had never been terminated. Decedent had visited Susie regularly and sent her
support payments until the time of his death in 1957. In 1952 certain realty in
the District of Columbia was deeded to decedent and Alice as tenants by the
entirety. Decedent died intestate, and shortly thereafter a dispute arose as to the
ownership of the property, Alice claiming to be the sole owner through the right
of survivorship, and Susie claiming that there was no survivorship and hence
that the property passed to her through intestate succession. Held: where a man
21 Both elements are required. Here the beaches were a direct result of the dredging,
but had no continuing relation to navigation.
22 State v. Gill, 259 Ala. 177, 66 So. 2d 141 (1953).
23 Supra note 16.
24 State v. Gill, 259 Ala. 177, 66 So. 2d 141 (1953).
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and woman are disabled from holding property as tenants by the entirety because
they are not legally married, a deed conveying property to them and purporting
to create a tenancy by the entirety created, instead, a joint tenancy, and not a
tenancy in common. Coleman v. Jackson, 286 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
At common law, a conveyance to two or more persons normally created one
of the following types of tenancies: a tenancy in common, a joint tenancy, or
a tenancy by the entirety.' joint tenancy existed as early as the thirteenth cen-
tury,' and Bracton commented that joint tenants were seized "pur my et per
tout."3 Littleton defined joint tenants as:
Joyntenants are, as if a man be seized of certain lands or tenements, &c.,
and enfeoffeth two, three, or four, or more, to have and to hold to them for
terme of their lives, or for terme of another's life, by force of which feoffment
or lease they are seized, these are joyntenants.4
Tenancy by the entirety is, for all practical purposes, a specialized type of
joint tenancy which is available to married persons. 5 It has the incident of sur-
vivorship, just as joint tenancy. The "doctrine" of survivorship means that each
tenant is seized of the whole of the estate, and upon the death of one tenant
the interests of the other tenants are freed from any participation by the interest
of the decedent. In bther words, if A and B are owners of Blackacre with the
right of survivorship, and A dies, B immediately becomes the owner of Blackacre
in severalty; A's heirs get nothing. This right is based upon the belief that the
estate is held by a fictitious unity composed of all of the cotenants, and that this
unity continues in existance as long as one or more of the tenants is still alive,
provided they do nothing to sever the tenancy. The four unities - time, title,
interest and possession - were a necessity in the creation of this entity. 6
Another incident, this one peculiar to tenancy by the entirety, is the inability
of either husband or wife, while both are living, to alienate any interest in the
tenancy without the consent of the other party.7 This incident is based upon the
"amiable fiction" of the union of husband and wife, that the marriage constitutes
but one person, and that this person or "unity" holds the property. Because of
this fiction, )this type of tenancy is available only to a husband and wife, and a
prerequisite for a tenancy by the entirety is a valid existing marriage.s So im-
portant is this requirement that if property is conveyed to a married couple as
tenants by the entirety, and their marriage is later terminated by a divorce, the
tenancy by the entirety is dissolved and the parties hold as joint tenants.9
There were certain presumptions which arose at common law concerning
the type of tenancy which would result from a particular conveyance. One of
these presumptions was that, if no contrary intent were expressed in the instru-
ment the intent of the parties was that the grantees hold as joint tenants.' 0 If
the grantees were husband and wife, the presumption was in favor of tenancy
by the entirety, and this presumption was followed even in cases where there
was a contrary intent expressed, the rationale being that a married couple could
not take by moieties."
In approximately forty-six' 2 of the fifty states, including the District of
1 DiBY, IIISTORY OF THE LAW oF REAL PROPERTY 274 (5th ed. 1897).
2 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
3 BRACTON, f. 13.
4 LITTLETON'S TENURES, lib. iii. c. 3. s. 277.
5 MICH. STATE B.J. 196, 199 (1926).
6 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 6.1.
7 FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND PARTITION § 64 (2nd ed. 1886).
8 Id.§ 63.
9 Enyeart v. Keppler, 118 Ind. 34, 20 N.E. 539 (1888); Stelz v. Shreck, 128 N.Y. 263,
28 N.E. 510 (1891).
10 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 18.
11 Id. § 71.
12 The four states which have not enacted legislation on this point are Louisiana, Ohio,
Nebraska and Wyoming. Louisiana, of course, never had the presumption favoring joint ten-
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Columbia, the effect of the common law presumption in favor of joint tenancy
has been lessened by statute.'3 This has been done either through an actual
change in the presumption to one in favor of tenancy in common,1 4 or by the
abolition of survivorship as an incident of joint tenancy.' 5 It is almost universally
provided, however, that these statutes do not apply to trustees and executors of
estates, presumably because of the desire for continuous management in the event
of the death of one tenant. 6 Also, it is often provided in these acts that they shall
not apply to a husband and wife holding as tenants by the entirety.' A novel
statute recently enacted in this field is a Wisconsin act which provides that a sur-
viving joint tenant or tenant by the entirety takes subject to any mortgages or
liens incurred by the decedent, but the act expressly provides that these mortgages
or liens shall not defeat the right of survivorship.' 5
ancy, so no change was necessary. "Although no statute has been enacted in Ohio abolishing
joint tenancy, it may be broadly stated that title to either real or personal property by techni-
cal joint tenancy is not recognized in Ohio... However, if the operative words of a deed or
will or other instrument clearly express the intention to create the right of survivorship, such
words will not be disregarded." 14 Ohio Jur.2d 89 (1955). In Nebraska it has been held that,
"Joint tenancies are created by contract, and if not so created do not exist . . . they axe not
favored, and if not expressly created by contract the law presumes the tenancy is in common."
Sanderson v. Everson, 93 Neb. 606, 607, 141 N.W. 1025, 1026 (1913). Thus it appears that
Wyoming is the only state that has not dealt with this problem either through legislation or
judicial determination.
13 ALA. CODE tit. 57, § 19 (1958); ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN. § 22-1-6 (1949); ARiz.
REV. STAT. § 14-204 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-411 (1947); CAL. CIV. CODE § 683 (West
1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118-2-1 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-14a (1958);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 § 701 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-816 (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 689.15 (1954); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1002 (1933); HAwAu REv. LAWS § 345-1 (1955);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-104, 508 (1953); ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 76 § I (Smith-Hurd 1934);
IND. ANN STAT. § 56-111 (1951); IOWA CODE ANN. § 557.15 (1956); KAN. GEN STAT. ANN.
§ 58-501 (1949); Ky. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 381-120 (1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 168, §
13 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 9 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, § 7 (1955);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.44 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.19(2) (1945); MSS. CODE ANN.
§ 834 (1942); Mo. ANN STAT. § 442.450 (1949); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 67-308, 313
(1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.065 (1957); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 477:18 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:3-17 (1940); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-1-14 (1953); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAWS
§ 66; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1956); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-06 (1960); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 84, § 184 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. § 93.180 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 121
(1950); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-3-1 (1956); S.C. CODE § 19-55 (1952); S.D. CODE §
51.0214 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-107 (1955); Tx. PROB. CODE § 46 (1956); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 57-1-5 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 2 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20
(1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.070 (1951); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 3539 (1955); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 230.44 (1957).
14 See, e.g., CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 47-14(a) (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1002
(1933).
15 See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. § 14-204 (1956); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381-120 (1955);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1956).
16 Amiz. REv. STAT. § 14-204 (1956); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118-2-1 (1953); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 701 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-816 (1951); HAWAII REV. LAWS §
345-1 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-104,508 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 76, § 1 (Smith-
Hurd 1934);IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-111 (1951); KANS. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-501 (1949);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381-130 (1955); Mimi. STAT. ANN. § 26.44 (1956); MINN. STAT.
ANN § 500.19(2) (1945); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.450 (1949); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
67-313 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.065 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-1-14 (1953);
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAWS § 66; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1956); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-06
(1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 93.180 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 121 (1950); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 34-3-1 (1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 2 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20
(1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.070 (1951); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 3539 (1955); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 230.44 (1957).
17 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.15 (1954); IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-511 (1951); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 26.44 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.450 (1949); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.065 (1957);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 2 (1959); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 230.45 (1957).
18 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.455 (Supp. 1961). The main impact of this statute stems from
the fact that it helps prevent tenants from becoming "judgment-proof" because their property
is subject to the right of survivorship in another.
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Statutes favoring tenancy in common over joint tenancy and/or abolishing
the right of survivorship have been thought to express legislative disfavor of joint
tenancy and survivorship, but they have not usually been construed to render them
illegal. Even under these statutes, a valid conveyance in joint tenancy with the
right of survivorship is still possible."'
This construction does not appear to have frustrated the "intent" of the
legislatures in passing these statutes; indeed, it seems clear that the "intent" was
not to outlaw these aspects of tenancy, but rather to remove the common law
presumption in favor of joint tenancy and to replace it with one in favor of
tenancy in common. In fact, a majority of these statutes provide that they shall
not apply where joint tenancy is "expressly declared," 20 "expressly granted,"21
"declared in its creation," 22 or where "the language . . .makes it clear that a
joint tenancy was intended .... "2' From the words of these statutes themselves,
therefore, it is evident that great weight is to be placed upon the intent expressed
by the parties. There is great diversity of opinion, however, as to what words are
necessary to satisfy the specificity requirements of these statutes. In states where
the incident of survivorship has been abolished, the courts have arrived at a similar
conclusion by saying that survivorship will be upheld if it is arrived at by a
definite contract.2 4
Thus, it appears that the only import which the courts have been willing
to give to these statutes is that a conveyance purporting to result in joint tenancy
with the incident of survivorship must be quite definite in its statement of that
purpose before it will be given the desired effect. This seems to be a quite logical
result, because these carry-overs from the common law, although ancient, are
still useful, and it is not necessary to destroy them in order to bring the law of
cotenancy into conformity with present day social conditions.
In the District of Columbia, the jurisdiction in which the Coleman case was
tried, there was in effect at the time of the conveyance in question a statutory
presumption in favor of tenancy in common. It provides, in part, that:
Every estate granted or devised to two or more persons in their own right,
including estates granted or devised to husband and wife, shall be a tenancy
in common, unless expressly declared to be a joint tenancy.. 25 (Emphasis
added.)
There is no doubt that under present law the conveyance in the Coleman
case could not result in a tenancy by the entirety, since decedent and Alice were
not husband and wife even under common law principles, so the court was faced
with two possible alternatives: joint tenancy or tenancy in common. A finding of
the former would go against the literal impact of the statute; a finding of the
latter would be a frustration of the intent of the decedent grantee.
Courts, and legislators also, have often felt compelled to foster ease of transfer,
or "liquidity," as it is often called in the field of property law. They have placed
great weight upon the intentions of the parties to the instrument, whether it be
a conveyance,"' a trust agreement,27 or a contract,2  ut res magis valeat quam
pereat - "that the thing might have effect rather than be destroyed."' ' This
19 See, e.g., Nash v. Martin, 90 Ga.App. 235, 82 S.E.2d 658 (1954); Palmer v. Flint, 121
A.2d 837 (Me. 1960). See generally 14 Am. JuR. Joint Tenancy §§ 84, 85 (1938); 48 C.J.S.
Joint Tenancy § 3 (1955).
20 D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-816 (1951).
21 Aaxi. STAT. ANN. § 50-411 (1947).
22 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-106 (1953).
23 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-501 (1949).
24 See, e.g., Peyton v. Wehrbane, 125 Conn. 420, 6 A.2d 313 (1939); Bowling v. Bowling,
243 N.C. 515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956).
25 D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-816 (1951).
26 Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala. 110, 5 So. 497 (1889).
27 Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill.2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955).
28 In re Howe's Estate, 31 Cal.2d 395, 189 P.2d 5 (1948).
29 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
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is, in effect, what the court in the Coleman case did. The court reasoned, quite
logically, to the conclusion that the statute involved applies "only where there is
no expression to the contrary in the conveyance,"30 and since "what the parties
intended in this case is clear . . . " the court decided that "the intention of
survivorship manifested in the deed can best be effected by declaring the cotenants
in this case to have been joint tenants."32 (Emphasis added.)
That the intent of the deceased with regard to the type of cotenancy he
desired was cleaxly expressed is evident from the facts. There is no evidence in
the case that the conveyance was the result of a gift or devise. Because of this,
it must be assumed that the deceased paid valuable consideration for the property,
and as a result of this payment he had the right to prescribe the type of tenancy
by which the property would be held. The court noted that -there was a clause
to the following effect on the face of the deed:
Sale of the above described property was ratified to said Thomas H.
Jackson (decedent) who has directed that conveyance be made to the parties
hereto of the second part as Tenants by the Entirety, as evidenced by his
signature hereto.3 3
Immediately following this sentence was the signature of the decedent. This
would surely seem to negate any contention that tenancy by the entirety was a
mere whim of the draftsman, rather than a definite intention of the decedent
grantee.
There is another aspect in this case which merits consideration. In the Cole-
man case the lower court had decided that Alice "did not live with him (decedent)
in good faith as his wife"'" 'because she knew of his prior marriage. It is sub-
mitted that few circumstances should have less effect upon the decision of the
questions in a case such as this than the morality of one of the parties. The ap-
pellate court disposed of this issue in such a logical and concise manner that its
words bear quotation:
[Tihis is not relevant to the question whether they were joint tenants.
Whatever society and we may think of the illicit relationship, the law recog-
nizes the rights of the participants to hold property jointly and to give or
bequeath property to each other without limitation imposed because of the
relationship. 35 .
The significance of this case stems not so much from the factual situation,
which admittedly would seldom occur, but from the difficult question of statutory
interpretation which was thrust upon the court, and the laudable manner in
which the court responded. The court in the Coleman case, by not confining it-
self to a mere repetition of the slogans of judicial passivism, reached a logical and
just result.
Theodore A. Fitzgerald
TAXATION - ACCRUAL BASIS CORPORATE TAXPAYER MUST INCLUDE IN ITS TAx-
ABLE INCOME AMOUNTS HELD TO TS CREDIT IN A RESERVE ACCOUNT IN THE YEAR
IN WHICH THE AMOUNTS WERE CREDITED. - A corporate taxpayer, who uses the
accrual basis of accounting, in order to gain a more liquid position, arranged with
financing agencies to sell them its customers' promissory notes, which were obtained
through the sale of its products. These notes consisted of the unpaid portion of
the selling price plus finance charges. In return, the finance agencies gave cash,
the face value of the notes less finance charges in one instance, and less finance
30 Instant case at 100.
31 Id. at 102.
32 Id. at 103.
33 Id. at 102 n.8. The draftsman, through this sentence, seems to be making doubly sure
that the intent of the grantee is dear. Query: Could it be that the draftsman had knowledge of
decedent's marital entanglements?
34 Instant case at 103.
35 Ibid.
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charges plus a 10% deduction in two other instances. The amounts retained by
the finance agencies were credited to a "dealer's reserve account," in the name
of the corporate taxpayer, for the purpose of securing payment on the notes ob-
tained from it. The taxpayer, during the taxable year, included in its gross income,
the cash received from its sales involving the promissory notes with the finance
agencies, but failed to include the amounts set aside in the reserve account. Held:
The accrual basis corporate taxpayer must include in its taxable income the amounts
held to its credit in the "dealer's reserve account" by the finance companies during
the year in which the amounts were credited to the dealer taxpayer. General Gas
Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 293 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1961).
The basis of the holding in General Gas was that when the finance company
credited the -"dealer's reserve account," the taxpayer acquired the fixed right to
receive the amounts and as such must include the amounts as taxable income for
the year in which the credit was made.1
The principles governing taxpayer's use of the accrual basis method of ac-
counting have been settled in the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United
States.2 Determining whether or not income is to be reported in one particular
year or another depends upon its receipt by the taxpayer. Just what is meant by
receipt is explained in Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner,3 where the court
stated:
Keeping accounts and making returns on the accrual basis, as distinguished
from the cash basis, import that it is the right to receive and not the actual
receipt that determines the inclusion of the amount in gross income. When
the right to receive an amount becomes fixed, the right accrues. 4
It is to be noted that the crucial factor in determining taxable income under
the accrual basis is to ascertain the instant when the right to receive becomes fixed
or certain; for if a contingency exists which creates a reasonable doubt as to the
collectibility of particular income 5 or prevents a determination of the amount with
reasonable certainty,6 the income will not be considered accrued for tax purposes. 7
Where a question arises as to whether there is a contingency or not, Continental Tie
and Lumber Co. v. United States points out that the contingency, in order to
prevent the accrual of income, must be real and substantial, and mere vague pos-
sibilities affecting determination of the amount or collection of the income will not
defer its accrual.
It is suggested at this point, that since the taxpayer will have to treat that
amount set aside in- the "dealer's reserve account" as income during the year in
which it was credited to that account, it would seem that the taxpayer could take
advantage of the bad debt provisions of the Internal Revenue Code for those
promissory notes which were uncollectible.9
In General Gas, the amounts held accrued were set aside by the finance agencies
in the "dealer's reserve account" as security for the payment of the notes which it
had received from taxpayer.'" In the event a particular note was unpaid, the par-
ticular finance company affected could charge the "reserve account" for the face
value of the note. As stated in the opinion, the "reserve account" was liable for
all customer defaults. 1 Also out of the "reserve account" interest payments were
1 General Gas Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 293 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1961).
2 Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944); Brown v. Helvering,
291 U.S. 193 (1934).
3 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
4 Id. at 184-85.
5 Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
6 Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944).
7 Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930).
8 286 U.S. 290 (1932).
9 INT. Rav. CODS OF 1954, § 166.
10 General Gas Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 293 F.2d 35, 38 (5th
Cir. 1961).
11 Ibid. at 38.
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paid to the finance companies under the financing contract between them and Gen-
eral Gas Corporation. "It receives in cash the cumulative reserve in excess of the
30% limit (under the financing agreement amounts in the "reserve account' were
to never be higher than 30% of outstanding notes) and of course, will eventually
receive the entire amount remaining to its credit. 12
The taxpayer contended that the amounts can be taxed as income only when
they are actually received; that there was no fixed right to receive prior to actual
payment. This argument was presented in Commissioner v. Hansen,5 a case in-
volving substantially similar facts, where the taxpayer contended that the amounts
that were retained by the finance companies and entered on their books as liabilities
to the dealers under their "reserve accounts"
were subject to such contingencies that it could not have been known
in the year of such retention and credits, what amount of those reserves
would actually be received by them and hence, they did not acquire, in the
year of such retention and credits, a fixed right to receive -in a later year
or at any time - the amounts so withheld and credited to them and there-
fore those amounts did not constitute accrued income to them.'4
The court in Hansen stated that the amounts so credited were subject to
liabilities which the dealer-taxpayer might have by way of customer default on
notes sold by it to the financing agencies, but pointed out that only those obliga-
tions which arose under the financing agreements could be offset against the "re-
serve accounts" and not just any obligations which General Gas might have to the
finance agencies. Only those amounts which were sold to the finance agencies in
the form of notes and were subsequently unpaid could be applied to such accounts.
These were the only authorized offsets. No amount could be charged by the finance
company against the "dealer's reserve account" without the authorization of the
company.
It follows that only one or the other of two things can happen to the
dealer's reserve account: (1) the finance company is bound to pay the full
amount to the dealer in cash, or (2) if the dealer has incurred obligations to
the finance company under his guaranty, endorsement or contract of sale,
of the installment paper, the finance company may apply so much of the
reserve as is necessary to discharge those obligations, and is bound to pay
the remainder to the dealer in cash.' 5
In Douglas v. Willcuts,'6 it was determined that a taxpayer receives income
when an obligation is discharged by another for his benefit. Since a taxpayer re-
ceives income when an obligation is discharged by another for his benefit, it would
follow that a fixed right to have an obligation discharged constitutes accrued income
to accrual basis taxpayers.' 7 The amounts in the "reserve accounts" applied to
the uncollectible notes, as unauthorized under the.financing agreement were as much
received as if General Gas Company had received cash. Since these amounts were
received and -since the "reserve accounts" were limited in use by the agreement
between General Gas and the finance companies, it follows that the amounts could
be taxed as income to the accrual basis taxpayer at the time the withheld amounts
were entered on the books of the finance companies as liabilities to the dealers since,
at that time, the dealers acquired a fixed right to receive the amounts so retained
by the finance companies.
In General Gas, when by contract it had agreed to make good all notes which
went bad, having the finance companies charge such uncollectible notes against the
"dealer's reserve account" the court, following Hansen, stated that General Gas
had received the entire amounts of those reserve credits.
The notes were indorsed by General Gas to the finance companies "without
12 Ibid. at 38.
13 300 U.S. 446 (1959).
14 Id. at 464, 465.
15 Id. at 465.
16 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
17 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 278 U.S. 716 (1929).
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recourse," whereas in Hansen, they were indorsed "with recourse." The court in
General Gas found this insignificant, since by agreement the finance agencies were
to charge the uncollectible notes against the "reserve accounts."1 s
The Internal Revenue Service has consistently maintained that amounts with-
held by finance companies to cover possible losses on notes purchased from dealers
constituted income to dealers who employ the accrual method of accounting, from
the time the amounts are recorded on the books of the finance companies as liabili-
ties to the dealers.' 9
The decision in Hansen compelled the decision in General Gas. Prior to Hansen
there was a conflict as to whether or not the creation of "dealer's reserve accounts"
constituted income for the dealer in the year in which the credits were made to
the account.20 Some cases held that such amounts were contingent and unascertain-
able. These cases placed stress on the fact that the finance companies would charge
notes uncollectible against the "reserve accounts," thus making the amount that
dealers might receive uncertain.
General Gas, amplifying the decision in Hansen has met this argument. As
long as the amounts held in the "reserve accounts" are ultimately to go to the tax-
payer in the form of cash or as the extinguishment of taxpayer's obligations arising
under the financing contract, the amounts in such "reserve accounts" must be in-
cluded in taxpayer's income for the year in which the amounts were credited to
such "accounts" for it was at that instant that taxpayer's right to receive became
fixed.
The scope of Hansen and General Gas leaves little apparent leeway for tax-
payers. However, it is suggested that making the "dealer's reserve accounts" liable
for any obligations arising between the companies and the finance agencies might
make the sum so uncertain as to avoid the impact of Hansen and General Gas. In
those cases emphasis was placed on the fact that the extinguishment of liabilities
was covered by the financing contract.
Robert W. Cox
TORTS - RELEASE - RELEASES GIVEN TO ORIGINAL TORTFEASORS CON-
STRUED TO DISCHARGE MANUFACTURER OF INTRAMEDULLARY NAIL AND OWNER OF
TRUCK INVOLVED IN ACCIDENT. - Plaintiff Clark suffered a compound fracture of
his right thighbone in an automobile accident. Surgeons inserted a surgical pin,
manufactured by defendant Zimmer Mfg. Co., to speed the mending process by
holding the jagged edges of the bone firmly together. One year later the pm
snapped, causing serious and permanent reinjury. Clark filed a complaint against
the defendant on a theory of implied warranty of the surgical pin. Zimmer's reply
asserted that plaintiff had given, prior to the institution of this action, a full release
to one Couture, the other party to the automobile accident. The Court of Appeals,
affirming summary judgment for the defendant Zimmer, held: under Massachusetts
law, the release given to Couture was a bar to the action. It could not be said as
a matter of law that the subsequent damage to plaintiff was a wholly new and
distinct injury. Clark v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 290 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1961).
18 General Gas Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 293 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1961).
19 G.C.M. 9571,,X-2 CuM. BULL. 153 (1931), most recent, Rev. Bull. 57-2, 1957-1
Cum. BULL. 17:
Amounts withheld by banks or finance companies to cover possible losses
on notes purchased from dealers constitute income to dealers employing the
accrual method of accounting, to the extent of their interest therein at the
time the amounts are recorded on the books of the bank or finance company
as a liability to the dealer.
20 Morgan v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1960); Texas Trailercoach v. Com-
missioner, 251 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1958).
RECENT DECISIONS
In a similar case, a dairy truck owned and driven by the defendant Gnagey
collided with an automobile driven by Carnegie. The plaintiff, a passenger in the
automobile, later released Carnegie from any liability for $1,518.87. Gnagey's de-
fense in this suit against him was based principally upon the release given to Car-
negie. In affirming judgment for defendant on the pleadings, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held: that the language of the release' specifically relieved the de-
fendant from any liability for damage inflicted by him. Hasselrode v. Gnagey,
404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764 (1961).
There is an old common law maxim that "the release of one or more joint
tortfeasors is a release of all the joint torffeasors." 2 On its face innocuous, in practice
the rule has led to surprising results, often called unjustifiable s because courts have
followed the theoretical logic of the rule without considering its practical effects.
Legal writers, in law reviews and treatises, have long voiced strong disapproval of
this rule.4
The two cases noted are characteristic of the result commonly expected years
ago, but seem out of step with the more recent trend of judicial reasoning. In the
Clark case, 5 a release given to a negligent motorist barred a suit against a negligent
manufacturer of surgical pins. In the Hasselrode case,6 an almost identical release
barred a subsequent action against a negligent truck driver, in the face of what
seems to present an insuperable obstacle, i.e., Section 4 of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act.?
At common laws it was assumed that where two or more persons, acting in
concert, committed a wrong, the cause of action accruing to the wronged party
was single and indivisible. Hence, the release of one wrongdoer dissolved that cause
of action completely. The arguments proposed in favor of this result were that
(1) there was but one cause of action, 9 (2) it would be unjust to permit double
recovery for one's injuries,' 0 (3) an inseparable injury forces an impossible appor-
1 Plaintiff does "release and forever discharge the said Frank R. Carnegie ... and any
and all other persons, associations and corporations, whether herein named or referred to or
not .. " Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764 (1961).
,2 Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111, 166 A.2d 892, 895 (1961); Abb v. Northern
Pacific Ry. Co., 28 Wash. 428, 68 Pac. 954 (1902).
3 E.g., wrongdoers not contributing to the consideration for the release are discharged;
the one attempting to make reparation bears the whole loss; compromises in settlement of tort
liability are discouraged; and tortfeasors are given an advantage inconsistent with their liability.
McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
4 COOLEY, TORTS § 80 (1930); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 933-35 (1951); HARPER AND
JAmEs, TORTS 711-12 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 244-45 (2d ed.. 1955); 2 WMLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 338A (1959); Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. R.v. 413
(1937); Wigmore, Release to One Joint Tortfeasor, 17 ILL. L. REv. 563 (1923); 33 NOTRE
DAmE LAWYER 443 (1961); 13 CORNELL L.Q. 473 (1928).
5 Clark v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 290 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1961).
6 Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764 (1961).
7 A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or
after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so
provides, but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of
the consideration paid for the release or in any amount or proportion by
which the release provides that the total clm shall be reduced if greater
than the consideration paid. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2085 (Supp. 1960).
(Emphasis supplied.)
8 Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 At. 883, 884 (1915). See generally McKenna
v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111, 166 A.2d 892
(1961).
9 Duck v. Mayeu, 2 Q.B. 511, 513 (1892).
10 Plaintiff is entitled to but one satisfaction. "When the plaintiff has accepted satisfaction
in full for the injury done him, .. . he is so far affected in equity and good conscience, that
the law will not permit him to recover again for the same damages." Lovejoy v. Murray, 3
Wall. 1, 17 (1865);
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tionment of damages," and (4) it is assumed that the one receiving the release
committed the whole tort and caused all the harms.' 2 As the holdings and dicta in
this vein multiplied, releases for injuries sustained at the hands of concurrent and
successive tortfeasors were included in the rule.'3 With this extension, the question
of proximate cause became important,1 4 i.e., whether the prior wrong was the
proximate cause of the following wrong, or whether the latter was a new and in-
dependent harm.
Where the release was given under seal, further problems arose, for it was
said that one could not protest that compensation received from one tortfeasor was
not intended to be full satisfaction, because the seal prevented inquiry into the
amount of adequacy of the consideration given in exchange.'5 Although saying
that the injured party was entitled to full satisfaction for harms done, courts often
confused satisfaction in form (e.g., a release)'" with satisfaction in reality - the
latter being full compensation, the former very often falling short of that.?7
Of special interest is the development of what might be called the "negligent
physician" type of case, since the Clark case bears the rationale of those cases. It
was said above that the release rule extended to successive tortfeasors, as well asjoint tortfeasors. If a person was injured and sought medical care, and the physician
chosen aggravated the injury, the tortfeasor responsible for the primary injury was
also liable for the aggravation.' 8 This follows the proximate cause rules of liability
for foreseeable results of an injury. Then if the injured party released the original
tortfeasor from liability, the release prevented any suit against the negligent physi-
cian.19 One can readily see that the Court of Appeals in the Clark case 20 has equated
This arbitrary approach to a consideration of the effect of a release goes
beyond any reasonable necessity to honor the principle of law that a litigant
should not recover twice for the same injury. Moreover, these holdings
offend the basic principle of the law that an injured party should be wholly
compensated for his injuries where liability exists. Couillard v. Charles T.
Miller Hospital, 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96, 100 (1958).
11 Foster v. Bussey, 132 Iowa 640, 109 N.W. 1105 (1906). But see Chipman v. Palmer,
77 N.Y. 51 (1879).
12 Abb v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 28 Wash. 428, 68 Pac. 954, 955 (1902). See also
Carey v. Bilby, 129 Fed. 203, 205 (8th Cir. 1904), to the effect that a release should be
strictly construed against the maker.
13 E.g., Southern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Raish, 205 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1953), where it was
said that there need be no collusion, concert, or common duty to make tortfeasors jointly
liable - merely an indivisible injury; but see Husky Refining Co. v. Barnes, 119 F.2d 715, 716
(9th Cir. 1941), "In the case of such independent concurring torts the release of one wrong-
doer does not release the other." Foster v. Bussey, 132 Iowa 640, 109 N.W. 1105 (1906).
See also McGannon v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 160 Minn. 143, 199 N.W. 894 (1924);
If the plaintiff's health was impaired through the negligence of his former
employer, and he subsequently sustained further injury through the negli-
gent acts of the railway company, thus aggravating his former injury, the
company would be liable to the extent that its acts aggravated the plaintiff's
condition, but the former employer would not be liable for such aggravation.
14 Mainfort v. Giannestras, 49 Ohio Op. 440, 111 N.E.2d 692, 694 (C.P. 1951). See
generally Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. Rv. 413 (1937).
15 Eastman v. Grant, 34 Vt. 387 (1861); Ellis v. Essau, 50 Wis. 138, 6 N.W. 518 (1880).
16 Gunther v. Lee, 45 Md. 60 (1876).
17 "The experts in this field agree that the distinction between satisfaction in form and
satisfaction in fact should be determined in every case, and control the result." Trieschman v.
Eaton, 224 Md. 111, 166 A.2d 892, 895 (1961). (Emphasis supplied.) See also PsossER,
TORTs 243-46 (2d ed. 1955).
18 Makarenko v. Scott, 132 W.Va. 430, 55 S.E.2d 88, 93 (1949), states the reasons: (1)
the unskilled treatment is a result which should reasonably have been anticipated by the tort-
feasor; (2) the tortfeasor is presumed to know the necessity of medical treatment, and is
accountable for its risks; and (3) the aggravation of the injury would not have occurred had
there been no original injury - the aggravation is a proximate result of the injury.
19 Harris v. Brian, 255 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1958); Tanner v. Espey, 128 Ohio St. 82, 190
N.E. 229 (1934).
20 290 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1961).
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the breach of an implied warranty of fitness with the negligent actions of a
physician. 2'
Not all courts adhere to the "negligent physician" rule at this time, and it is
probable that most would allow an evasion in one of two ways. First, where the
negligence of the physician occasions a distinct and separate injury, the release
given to the first wrongdoer can be held of no relevance in the successful prosecution
of a suit against the former. 22 Second, where the terms of the release indicate no
intent to release anyone but the original wrongdoer, that intent may be given effect.23
Where the plaintiff's original recovery is had under a Workmen's Compensation Act,
some courts apply another limitation, narrower in scope than the preceding two.
They say that relief under the particular Workmen's Compensation Act, and relief
based upon negligent treatment, are distinct legal claims and a release of one will
not bar the other.24
The developments seen in the cases dealing with negligent physicians are a
micro-mirror of the over-all manner in which release problems are handled. Releases
are being construed more liberally; successful collateral attack is becoming more
common; and the legal effects of releases are coming more into line with what one's
instinctive sense of fair dealing and justice would demand. Four categories by
which circumvention of the release rule is accomplished delineate the routes by
which liberal judicial thought is traveling, and will continue to do so.2 5
(1) The Covenant Not To Sue
Construing a would-be release as a covenant not to sue has been by far the
most common device by which the harshness of the release rule has been avoided.26
21 Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960), deals with a similar situa-
tion, arriving at a different result than in Clark even though Michigan law seemed to follow
the release rule. The wording of the release here, however, differed in that it expressly reserved
the right of the releasor to sue others for the injury. See also Von Blumenthal v. Cassola,
166 Misc. 744, 3 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1938), aff'd 254 App. Div. 857, 6 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1938),
where it was held that a negligent actor cannot be a joint, concurrent, or successive tortfeasor
with one charged with breach of warranty. There are no other cases on this point.
22 Mainfort v. Giannestras, 49 Ohio Op. 440, 111 N.E.2d 692, 694 (C.P. 1951):
The sole question is whether the negligence of the defendant surgeon ag-
gravated the original injury or created an independent injury, unassociated
with the original wrong and not reasonably foreseeable by the original wrong-
doer as a natural sequence of his wrong.... If said injuries are found to be
the result of a distinct and independent wrong the release is no bar to this,
suit.
23 Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96, 97 (1958). The
court in its syllabus, after giving the general (release) rule, said:
[T]he fact that an injured person has signed a release in general terms
will not prevent him from showing by parol evidence that he was never com-
pensated for and never intended to release claims based on injuries caused
by the subsequent tortfeasor for which the releasee is also liable because of
the rules of proximate cause. The intent of the parties on the question of
actual compensation is a question of fact for the jury. The release is, how-
ever, prima facie evidence that full compensation was received from the orig-
inal wrongdoer, including injuries caused by subsequent tortfeasors, and the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the contrary.
24 White v. Matthews, 221 App. Div. 551, 224 N.Y. Supp. 559, 562-63 (1927); contra,
Makarenko v. Scott, 132 W.Va. 430, 55 S.E.2d 88 (1949). The Clark court relied on Vatalaro
v. Thomas, 262 Mass. 383, 160 N.E. 269 (1928), and Purchase v. Seelye, 231 Mass. 434, 121
N.E. 413 (1918), both of which dealt with claims under a statute of this kind. (If the Clark
case had come before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, it is possible that the
factors of the recent trend in judicial thinking as regards releases, and the element of breach
of implied warranty would have influenced a different decision.)
25 These categories are merely intended as a frame of reference for ease in discussion. The
lines of demarcation are not absolute.
26 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn.
74, 92 Atl. 883 (1915); Myers v. Kennedy, 306 Mo. 268, 267 S.W. 810 (1924); Holland v.
Southern Public Utilities Co., 208 N.C. 289, 180 S.E. 592 (1935).
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The theoretical justification 27 lies in the distinction between the effects of the two.
Where a release extinguishes a cause of action, a covenant not to sue merely makes
the remedy inaccessible, and so meets the objection of dissolution of an indivisible
cause of action .2  A few courts are more forthright, and reject any such distinction .2
(2) Full Compensation
What this means is that the court's primary inquiry is directed to the question
of whether the plaintiff received full compensation, or "satisfaction in fact," for
his injuries.2 0 More specifically, as applied to the multiple tortfeasor situation, a
court will not prevent a litigant from suing, even though he has executed one or
more releases to possible defendants. The court will, however, credit pro tanto any
amount received by plaintiff in satisfaction (by release, judgment, or other means)
to the account of the particular defendant being sued.31
We could not well do otherwise and retain our conception of the purpose
sought to be accomplished by the rule, and of the ultimate test to be applied
in effectuating that purpose-to wit, the satisfaction of the injured party.
Plainly the rule was not formulated out of a tender regard for joint tort-
feasors, and to furnish a shield for them against demands for satisfaction for
their wrongs. 2
(3) The Intent of the Parties to the Release
Two questions immediately arise under this heading (a) whether the contract-
ing parties manifest a discernible intent as to what effect the release should have
on liability of third persons; and if not, (b) whether parol evidence should be ad-
mitted to make clear to what extent rights of third parties were intended to be
affected.
As to the first inquiry, an express reservation of the right to sue third parties,
named or not, is more generally given effect by the courts,22 even though there are
old English decisions (followed by one or two American jurisdictions) 4 holding
the contrary2 5 There is more disagreement as to what answer should be given to
the second question, concerning the admissibility of parol evidence.38 The con-
flict in opinion is intensified when it is contended that between a person not in
privity with the releasor and the releasor himself, the parol evidence has no applica-
27 In practical effect, however, the distinction is artificial and meaningless. McKenna v.
Austin, note 26, supra.
28 It is interesting to note, in connection with the comment in note 24, supra, that Massa-
chusetts has precedent justifying such a result. See Matheson v. O'Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 97
N.E. 638 (1912), in which a release was held to be a covenant not to sue, where it was evident
that less than full compensation was received by the plaintiff.
29 Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954).
30 Myers v. Kennedy, 306 Mo. 268, 267 S.W. 810, 815 (1924).
31 Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111, 166 A.2d 892, 896-97 (1961).
32 Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883, 888-89 (1915).
33 Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 292 Pac. 577 (1930). A large number of courts have
given effect to a release with an express reservation of rights against others by interpreting it
as a covenant not to sue, e.g., Myers v. Kennedy, 306 Mo. 268, 267 S.W. 810 (1924). Contra,
McBride v. Scott, 132 Mich. 176, 93 N.W. 243 (1903).
34 Flynn v. Manson, 19 Cal. App. 400, 126 Pac. 181 (1912). This case is no longer good
law in California, and it is doubted that any other jurisdiction at the present time would follow
it in principle or in name.
35 The early English cases . . . follow the logic of this rule to the conclusion
that any kind of a settlement, release or satisfaction, even though expressly
limited to certain parties, operates to discharge all who participated in the
wrong. The idea underlying . .. is that the primary intention to release is
• . . to be carried out, and all inconsistent reservations must be ignored as
repugnant to the purpose of the release. . . . Walsh v. New York Central &
H.R. R. Co., 204 N.Y. 58, 97 N.E. 408, 410 (1912).
See also Duck v. Mayeu, 2 Q.B. 511 (1892), which shows the reversal of English law on this
point.
36 Parol evidence should be admitted: Safety Cab Co. v. Fair, 181 Okla. 264, 74 P.2d 607,
609 (1937). It should not: Muse v. De Vito, 243 Mass. 384, 137 N.E. 730 (1923).
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tion." The newer attitude is reflected in the cases no longer dealing with releases
as sacrosanct, and giving greater freedom in setting them aside on the grounds of
fraud, mutual mistake, undue influence, unconsciqnability, and so on.36
(4) Effectuation of Remedial Legislation
Perhaps the major development in this area has been the trend in those states
which have adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, including
Section 4 of the Act as set out in note 7, supra.5 9 The legislative intent, seen in the
Act, to nullify the effect of the release rule, has been followed in most jurisdictions
where the issue has been decided.40 It is submitted that where construction of a release
allows more than one meaning, as was possible in the Hasselrode case,-4 the policy
of full compensation should be given considerable weight in determining the final
outcome. Justice Musmanno's caustic dissent42 amply indicated the desire for
greater liberality in construing releases so as to effectuate the policy of the applicable
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
Notwithstanding the increase of judicial freedom in cases dealing with releases,
the cases do indicate that the "spirit" of the release rule is deeply ingrained in the
law, and great care must be exercised by counsel wishing to avoid its application.
43
An indispensable requirement of any release signed by a plaintiff desirous of further
recovery is an express reservation of rights to sue third parties, which should be
explicit to the point of naming names. It is probable that failure to insist upon
such a provision would be inexcusable negligence by counsel for the plaintiff. The
broadly inclusive wording of the releases44 in bath Clark and Hasselrode was the.
fatal defect, and could easily have been avoided.
Philip B. Byrne
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS - PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS - VOLUNTARY
ASSOCIATION SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL SCRUTINY WHEN MEMBERSHIP POLICIES OF
EXCLUSION CONFLICT WITH PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE. - Italo John Falcone
pursued an accelerated undergraduate course at Rutgers University and Villanova
College. He next completed the course of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathy,
37 In Shea v. New York, C. & St.L. R. Co., 105 Fed. 559, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1901), the
court cited GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE § 279:
[Tihis rule is applied only . . . between the parties to the instrument, as
they alone are to blame if the writing contains what was not intended, or
omits that which it should have contained. It cannot affect third persons,
who, if it were otherwise, might be prejudiced by things recited in the writ-
ings, contrary to the truth, through the ignorance, carelessness, or fraud of
the parties, and who ... ought not to be precluded from proving the truth,
however, contradictory to th" written statements of others...
and went further to say that mutuality requires that this right be open to both parties. Accord,
Reams v. Janoski, 268 Ill. App. 8 (1932); contra, Martin v, Setter, 184 Minn. 457, 239 N.W.
219 (1931). See generally 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 931-35 (1951), and in particular § 934.
38 Jordan v. Guerra, 23 Cal.2d 469, 144 P.2d 349 (1944); Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill. App.
2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733 (1960); Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957); but
see Corbett v. Bomey, 121 S.E.2d 476 (Va. 1961).
39 See generally 33 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 291 (1958).
40 See, e.g., Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co., 47 Del. 343, 91, A.2d 245 (1952).
41 Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764 (1961).
42 Id. at 765-69.
43 Compare Tanner v. Espey, 128 Ohio St. 82, 190 N.E. 229 (1934) with Adams Express
Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 126 N.E. 300 (1919); and Lisoski v. Anderson, 112 Mont.
112, 112 P.2d 1055 (1941) with Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 292 Pac. 577 (1930). See
also Price v. Baker, 143 Colo. 264, 352 P.2d 90 (1959), and Farrar v. Wolfe, 357 P.2d 1005(Okla. 1960).
44 Clark, at 850: "[R]elease . .. Roland F. Couture and any and all other persons, firms
and corporations... ."; Hasselrode, at 764: "[R]elease ... Frank R. Carnegie . . . and any
and all other persons, associations and corporations, whether herein referred to or not.
(Emphasis supplied.)
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graduating with a degree D. 0. Then, after he served a one-year internship and
a three-year residency at the Detroit Osteopathic Hospital, he presented his cre-
dentials to the New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners. Falcone passed the
prescribed medical examination and was certified by the State Board as licensed
"to practice Medicine and Surgery in the State of New Jersey."
Falcone then attended the medical school of the University of Milan for one
academic year and, having received credit from Milan for his studies at the Phila-
delphia College of Osteopathy, he was awarded an M. D. Upon his return to the
U.S., Doctor Falcone served a second, medical, internship at St. Peter's Hospital
in New Brunswick, New Jersey, and a brief residency at the Jersey City Medical
Center. Shortly thereafter, he was admitted to the Middlesex County Medical
Society as an associate member, a temporary status of two years maximum duration.
Following this admission, he practiced surgery and obstetrics in the city of New
Brunswick. During this period he was a member of the staff of both St. Peter's
Hospital and the Middlesex General Hospital. Just before the expiration of his
two-year associate membership in the County Society, Falcone's early osteopathic
education came to the knowledge of the Societ .
Basing its action on an unwritten requirement of its Committee on Medical
Ethics, the County Society refused to admit Falcone to active membership. Appeal
to the State Medical Society availed him nothing. The Judicial Council of the
American Medical Association ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to hear his
further appeal. Immediately following his exclusion from active membership in the
County Society, Doctor Falcone was removed from the staffs of both of the local
hospitals in which he had practiced.
An action was brought in the Law Division of the courts of New Jersey seeking
an order directing the County Society to admit Falcone into membership. After
trial, the Superior Court so ordered. The defendant Society appealed to the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey, arguing that plaintiff had no judicially enforceable right
of admission to membership. Held: affirmed. Exclusion of a qualified applicant
from a professional association which results in the applicant's partial exclusion from
the practice of his profession is contrary to natural justice and the public policy
of the State of New Jersey. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 34
N. J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
The position of the courts with respect to the relationship between individuals
and voluntary associations has so long been characterized by extreme reluctance to
interfere that a case like Falcone is well worth careful study.' This policy against
intervention has been reiterated so frequently as to make the citation of cases up-
holding it unnecessary. The various considerations influencing the courts to avoid
interference were summarized by Professor Chaffee as the 'Hot Potato Policy'
(involuntary associations can become very incensed at intervention), the 'Dismal
Swamp Policy' (courts cannot be expected to inquire into the elaborate internal
politics of such associations) and the 'Living Tree Policy' (judicial interference
could stifle such organizations).' As a result of this policy of non-intervention,
judicial relief in the areas of exclusion and expulsion from voluntary associations
has been exceptional and limited in scope. The rising importance of voluntary or-
ganizations in contemporary life3 has however led to considerable protest against
this judicial attitude. Much of this protest has been directed against the characteri-
zation of some associations as voluntary at all. On this point Professor Robsen is
worth quoting.
The fact that a body is generally a voluntary society does not necessarily
mean that every member has joined of his own spontaneous desire or
1 Stoljar, The Internal Affairs of Associations, in LEGAL PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL
PLURALISM (1958).
2 Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HAzv. L. REv. 993, 1021(1930).
3 See BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954).
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even of his own free will .... All that is implied by the conception of. a
voluntary association is, in fact, the idea of a group that was originally cre-
ated by the voluntary coming together of free persons for the furtherance of
a common purpose and the embodiment of that coming together in some
more or less permanent and tangible institution. This is the mark and sign of
the true voluntary society, and often enough, indeed, the only "voluntary"
element to be found remaining in the coercive, ruthless, arbitrary and auto-
eratic bodies which sometimes pass by that name.
4
The argument of the scholars has usually been either for the replacement of
the narrow theories limiting relief in expulsion cases5 or for a division of voluntary
associations into those which are truly social and those which have economic im-
pact." Falcone doubtless represents a judicial response to the writings of the legal
scholars. In order to understand the nature and extent of this response, it is neces-
sary to survey the development of the earlier law in this area.
Most of the actions 'involving membership in voluntary associations have been
suits by expelled members rather than excluded persons. Because legal theories
developed in expulsion cases have helped to shape the law in the exclusion area,
they must be briefly considered. The courts which have interfered in expulsio
cases have generally required that some sort of property interest of the expellee
be lost.1 In granting relief, they have often relied on a theory that the articles of
association form a contract between the members and the association and that
only for violation of this contract is a remedy available." Under the latter test,
judicial relief was generally held to be available only where 1) the rules of the
society were contrary to natural justice, 2) the society failed to abide by its own
rules, 3) there was evidence of malicious unfairness in the enforcement of the rules.,,
This theory seems to demand no more than procedural due process for the expellee,
though it seems that the English courts at least have employed it to protect sub-
stantive rights.' 0
The controversy over the proper attitude of the courts toward expulsions does
not directly concern us here, but it is clear that jurisdictions which limit their relief
in expulsion to cases where the member has lost a property right and had his
contract with the other members breached, can logically give no relief to a person
who has merely been- excluded from an association."' Thus, most of the reported
cases have refused relief of any sort to plaintiffs complaining of exclusion. One
of the most forceful statements of this approach appeared in Cline v. Insurance
Exchange of Houston.12 The court in that case said, "A voluntary association has
4 RoBsoN, JUSTICE AND ADMINI sTATiVE LAW 318; 319 (3rd. ed. 1951).
5 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARv. L.
REv. 640 (1916); Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 IAv. L.
Rv. 993 (1930); Note, 22 U. op CHr. L. REv. 694, 703 (1955).
6 Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion from Union Activities, 22 Osiro ST.
L. J. 21 (1961); Note, 65 YALE .L. J. 369 (1956).
7 Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897); White v. Brownell, 2 Daly 329
(N.Y. Ct. of App. 1868); Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 482 (1880).
8 Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc. 601, 122 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. A. 1910).
9 Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 615 (1881).
10 Lee v. Showman's Guild of Great Britain, [1952] 2 Q.B. 329; Abbot v. Sullivan, [1952],
1 K.B. 189; See, The Use of the Injunction to Restrain Wrongful Expulsion from Voluntary
Associations, 1 SYDNEY L. Rzv. 186, 195 (1954).
11 Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARv. L. Rlv. 609, 619
(1959).
12 Sebastion v. Quarter Century Club of United Shoe Machinery Corp., 327 Mass. 178,
97 N.E.2d 412 (1951); Gold Knob Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Outdoor Advertising Associa-
tion of Texas, 225 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Chapman v. American Legion, 244
Ala. 553, 14 So. 2d 225 (1943); Cline v. Insurance Exchange of Houston, 140 Tex. 175, 166
S.W. 2d 677 (1943); Greenwood v. Building Trades Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 Pac. 823
(Dist. Ct. App. 1925); Horan v. Blink, 17 Pa. Dist. 363 (1908). Contra, In re Guess, 16 Misc.
306, 38 N.Y. Supp. 91 (Sup. Ct. 1896). Weinber v. Inglis, (1919) 1 A.C. 606 (Eng.); Rex
v. Lincoln's Inn, 4 Bunn & C. 825, 99 Eng. Rep. 1277 (1825); King v. Bishop of London, 15
East 117, 104 Eng. Rep. 789 (1812); Rex v. Gray's Inn, 1 Doug 353, 99 Eng. Rep. 227 (K.G.
1780).
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the power to enact rules governing the admission of members and prescribing certain
qualifications for membership: such rules will be enforced unless they are against
good morals or violate the laws of the state.""
A significant exception to the general rule of non-interference with exclusion
is developing in cases of exclusion from labor unions.14 The early cases involving ad-
mission to unions generally reached the same result on much the same reasoning
as other exclusion cases. 5 This earlier approach is illustrated by a union case in
New York where the court said, "There is no rule of law anywhere which gives
power to a court to compel a membership corporation or a voluntary association
to accept an applicant as a member of such bodies .... "'6 The realization was
growing, however, that the "basic difference between a social organization and a
labor union lies in the control which the union has over the economic opportunities
of the excluded worker."' 7 The same idea has been more dramatically expressed as
follows, "To exclude a man from a club may be to deny him a pleasant dinner
companion, but to exclude a worker from a union may be to deny him the right
to eat.""' The fruits of this idea are a group of cases holding that no one may be
barred from a job by a simultaneously closed shop and closed union.19 It must be
noted however that in all but one of these cases the relief given to the plaintiff has
not been an order that they be admitted into the union, but rather an alternative
remedy requiring that the union either admit them or not enforce the closed shop
agreement against them. Only in Thorman v. International Alliance20 was admis-
sion specifically ordered.
The cases dealing with admission to and retention of membership in medical
societies have largely followed the patterns described above.2' In the exclusion
area, however, statutes in England and New York making membership in a medical
society a prerequisite of practice led to extensive judicial review of refusal to admit.'2
The position of medical societies as voluntary associations largely free from
judicial scrutiny was seriously modified by a series of anti-trust suits arising out of
controversies between local medical societies and cooperative health care groups.
23
"13 140 Tex. 175, 166 S.W.2d 677 (1943).
14 Blunrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion from Union Activities, 22 OHIO STATE
L. J. 21 (1961).
15 Frank v. National Alliance, 89 N.J.L. 380, 99 AtI. 134 (L. 1916); Meyer v. Journey-
men Stonecutters Association, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 AtI. 492 (oh. 1890).
16 Simons v. Berry, 210 App. Div. 90, 205 N.Y. Supp. 442, 444 (1942).
17 Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion from Union Activities, 22 OHIo ST.
L. J. 21 (1961).
18 Summers, The Right to join a Union, 47 COL. L. Rv. 33 (1947).
19 Thorman v. International Alliance, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958); Wilson v.
Hacker, 200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Selgman v. Toledo Moving Picture
Operators, 88 Ohio App. 137, 98 N.E.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1947); Williams v. International
Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946); Local 104 v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 33 Wash. 2d 1, 203 P.2d 1019 (1945); James v. Marn-
ship Corp., 25 Cal 2d 751, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Carrol v. Local 269, 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 31
A.2d 225 (Ch. 1943).
20 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958).
21 Expulsion: Smith v. Kern 'Co. Med. Ass'n., 19 Cal. 2d 263, 120 P.2d 874 (1942);
Weyrens v. Scotts Bluff Co. Med. Soc., 133 Neb. 815, 277 N.W. 378 (1938); State ex rel.
Hyde v. Jackson Co. Med. Soc., 295 Mo. 144, 243 S.W. 341 (1922); Brown v. Harris Co.
Med. Soc., 194 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Gregg v. Mass. Med. Soc., 111 Mass. 185,
15 Am. Rep. 24 (1872). Exclusion: Medical Society of Mobile County v. Walker, 245 Ala.
135, 16 So. 2d 321 (1944); State ex rel. Hartigan v. Momangalia Co. Med. Soc., 87 W.Va.
273, 124 S.E. 826 (1924). See generally, Note, Expulsion and Exclusion from Hospital Prac-
tice & Organized Medical Societies, 15 RUToERS L. Rv. 327 (1961).
22 People ex rel. Bartlett v. The Medical Society of the County of Erie, 32 N.Y. 187 (Ct.
App. 1865); Ex Parte Paine, 1 Hill 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841); Rex v. Askew, 4 Burr 2186, 98
Eng. Rep. 139(K.B. 1768); Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610).
23 See American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1942); Group Health
Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Soc., 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737
(1951).
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The lower court in the Falcone case emphasized the fact that the A.M.A. and its
component societies substantially control the entrance into and practice of medicine
through control of the medical schools and the hospitals.2 4 An extensive study of the
A.M.A. appearing in the Yale Law Journal revealed that membership in a county
society may be ka prerequisite to 1) a reputation of competence 2) a license to
practice 3) malpractice insurance 4) certification of specialization 5) emergency
assistance 6) the privilege of practice in hospitals.25 Such findings of power seem
to make the imposition of some judicial safeguards inevitable.
The law of New Jersey on admission to voluntary associations before Falcone
had developed in much the same way as the decisions traced in the preceding para-
graphs. Two cases late in the 19th century held that there could be no judicial
remedy for exclusion.2" Both of these cases involved trade unions. More recent
cases, however, held that there could not be simultaneously a closed shop and
closed union.2' Two cases in the last decade distinguished the labor union situation
and held that there is no right of membership in a charitable corporation2 or a
fraternal order.29 The second of these cases, Trautwein v. Harbourt, distinguished
fraternal orders such as the defendant Order of the Eastern Star from organizations
in which membership is an "economic necessity."3 0
Thus, the judicial policy against intervention in voluntary associations may
be seen to have resulted in relief for a minority of persons expelled or excluded
from them. Relief in expulsion cases was generally limited by theories which al-
together precluded relief in exclusion cases, with the partially recognized exception
of exclusion from a union. On the books in 1960 there were only two modern cases
explicitly ordering that membership in a voluntary association be granted.31
It is in this legal context that we must examine Falcone.
The trial court in Falcone had expressly held that where a voluntary member-
ship association so controls the practice of a trade or profession as to become in
fact an involuntary association, such an association becomes subject to strict judicial
scrutiny and that the exclusion of Doctor Falcone "contravenes the public policy
of the State."32 In approving this holding the Supreme Court first recited the facts
summarized above, laying heavy emphasis on Doctor Falcone's qualifications to
practice all branches of medicine and the fact that the State of New Jersey had so
licensed him.33 The court next described the adverse economic effects upon the
plaintiff, arising from the action of the defendant.3 4 It stated that it was clear from
the record that Doctor Falcone, due to his having been dropped from the local
hospital staffs, would no longer be able to successfully continue his practice of
obstetrics and surgery because membership in the Society was a prerequisite to the
use of hospital facilities.3 5 The court then referred to a number of cases and law
review articles establishing the monopoly held 'by the County Society (through
24 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324, 329-
30 (L. 1960).
25 Note, 63 YALE L.J. 937, 949-50 (1954).
26 Frank v. Natural Alliance, 89 N.J.L. 380, 99 Ad. 134 (L. 1916); Mayer v. Journey-
men Stonecutters Ass'n., 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492 (Ch. 1890).
27 Carrol v. Local 269, 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 31 A.2d 223 (Ch. 1943); Wilson v. Newspaper
and Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 343, 197 At. 720 (Ch. 1938).
28 Leeds v. Harrison, 7 N.J. Super. 558, 72 A.2d 271 (L. 1950).
29 Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 123 A.2d 30 (App. Div. 1956).
30 Id. at 264, 170 A.2d at 39.
31 Thorman v. International Alliance, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958); Group
Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Soc., 39 Wash. 2d. 586, 237
P.2d 737 (1951).
32 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 201, 162 A.2d 324,
333 (L. 1960).
33 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 34 N.J. 582, 586-87, 170 A.2d 791, 794(1961).
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
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its affiliation with the American Medical Association) over the practice of medicine
in Middlesex County.3s It quoted with approval the statement appearing in. the
Yale Law Journal to the effect that non-membership amounts tq a partial revoca-
tion of licensure to practice medicine3 7
Referring to the trial court's holding that the defendant's action'was contrary
to "public policy," the court sought first to establish the relevance of policy argu-
ments in the courts of New Jersey,35 citing its recent decisions: imposing a higher
standard of care on landlords, 39 permitting corporate gifts to charity,4 0 holding pre-
natal injuries compensable,y4 eliminating charitable immunity42 and limiting the
effect of express warranties by manufacturers. 43 Stressing the Holmesian doctrine
that public policy is at the bottom of every important principle which is developed
by litigation," the court referred to the -traditional common law reluctance to i-
terfere in the affairs of voluntary associations.i5 Conceding that this reluctane is
in most cases wise, the court nevertheless emphasized that "in particular situations,
where the considerations of policy and justice were sufficiently compelling, judicial
scrutiny and relief were not found wanting .... Citing New Jersey cases involving
expulsion from social organizations and cases from other jurisdictions dealing specifi-
cally with expulsions from medical societies, the court noted that the property and
contract theories have been sometimes used in giving relief while in other cases
expulsions have been set aside on the bases of unreasonableness, injustice and viola-
tion of public policy.4 7 The court relied on Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa
Medical Associations4 as support for the proposition that any medical association's
by-law which is against public policy is unenforceable.
When confronted with the recent superior court case of Trautwein v. Har-
bourt,49 discussed above, the court attempted to state the exact dimensions of its
action:
We are here concerned with and therefore deal solely with an organiza-
tion, membership in which may be here, in the language of Trautwein,
reviewed as "an economic necessity"; in dealing with such an organization,
the Court must be particularly alert to the need for truly protecting the pub-
lic welfare and advancing the interest of justice by reasonably safeguarding
the individual's opportunity for earning a livelihood while not impairing the
standards and objectives of the organization.50
Immediately following this statement, the court discussed six cases which it regarded
as supporting its position. In the first,5' a licensed physician, seeking to fulfill a
statutory duty imposed upon him by the law of New York, sought admission into
his county medical society. He was refused admission on the grounds of a previous
violation of the AMA's ethical prohibition against advertising. The New York Court
of Appeals found this an insufficient ground for exclusion and ordered the plaintiff
36 Ibid.
37 Id. at 588, 170 A.2d at 795.
38 Ibid.
39 Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959).
40 A. P. Smith Mfg. 'Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
41 Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
42 Callopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 191 A.2d 276 (1958).
43 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
44 HOLMss, THE COMmON LAw 35 (1st ed. 1881).
45 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 34 N.J. 582, 590, 170 A.2d 791, 796
(1961).
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 39 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 862 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
49 22 N.J. Super. 220, 125 A.2d 283 (1956).
50 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 34 N.J. 582, 591, 170 A.2d 791, 796
(1961).
51 People ex rel. Bartlett v. Medical Society of the County of Erie, 32 N.Y. 187 (Ct. App.
1865).
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admitted to full membership. The second,52 one of the monopoly suits against the
AMA, also resulted, after a finding that a County Society's action violated the
'State's anti-monopoly prohibitions, in an injunction forbidding the exclusion of
the plaintiff from membership. The Marinship case,85 was quoted by the court to
the effect that when a union attains a monopoly of a supply of labor through use
of the closed shop, its freedom to exclude persons from membership is severely
curtailed because in such a situation the power to choose members affects not
merely "social relations" but "the fundamental right to work for a living." The
next three were New Jersey cases5 ' similar to Marinship in their facts and containing
similar language. Thorman v. International Alliance,5 the last case reviewed by
the court, appeared to be the only one in which, as was noted above, a union was
specifically ordered to admit a person to membership.
The court seems to have employed these cases to illustrate its next proposition:
that the public policy considerations in modem cases involving trade and professional
associations are substantially different than those of the earlier cases dealing with
social, religious and fraternal associations. The Court-said of the former situations
that "there have been persuasive indications, . .. that in a case presenting sufficiently
compelling factual and policy considerations, judicial relief will be available to com-
pel admission to membership." 58 This seems nothing more than a re-statement of
the court's "economic necessity" test just presented. Yet in the next section the
court seems to go farther. Noting that the public is greatly concerned with the
affairs of this private voluntary membership association because of its virtual mo-
nopoly over the local hospitals and its power to exclude Falcone and thereby limit
local patients' free choice of physician, the court said that "public policy strongly
dictates that this power should not be unbridled, but should be viewed judicially
as a fiduciary power to be exercised in reasonable and lawful manner for the ad-
vancement of the interests of the medical profession and the public generally; the
evidence firmly displays that here it was not so exercised, and that Doctor Falcone
was fairly and justly entitled to the relief awarded him in the Law Divisions."5
Finally, and somewhat summarily, the court handled the problem of the validity
of the use by the County Medical Society of its requirement of four years of study
in an AMA-approved medical school. This requirement, it was said, need not be
considered in its general application because of Doctor Falcone's eminent qualifica-
tions.5 8 As applied to him, such a requirement was said to be "arbitrary and un-
reasonable and beyond the pale of the law." 59 Summing up its decision the court
closed by saying:
When the County Society engages in action which is designed to advance
medical science or elevate professional standards, it should and will be sym-
pathetically supported. When, however, as here, its action has no relation
to the advancement of medical science of the elevation of professional stand-
ards but runs strongly counter to the public policy of our State and the true
interests of justice, it should and will be stricken down.60
Viewed exclusively on its particular facts and with regard solely to the court's
action, Falcone is eminently clear. A qualified and licensed physician who was de-
prived of ability to fully practice his profession by his exclusion from the defendant
52 Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Soc., 39 Wash. 2d
586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
53 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
54 Carrol v. Local 269, 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 31 A.2d 233 (Ch. 1943); Wilson v. Newspaper
& Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 343, 197 Ad. 720 (Ch. 1938); Cameron v. Interna-
tional Union, 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 176 Atl. 692.
55 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958).
56 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 34 N.J. 582, 596, 170 A.2d 791, 799(1961).
57 Id. at 596-97, 170 A.2d at 799.
58 Id. at 598, 170 A.2d at 800.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
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society was ordered admitted to it. The element of natural justice so .frequently
stressed by the court was plainly satisfied by its ruling. Yet any attempt to state
in a single sentence this court's position as to voluntary associations and to thereby
predict its future action would flounder for want of a clear statement by the Court
of the limits of its decision.
In three succeeding statements of increasing generality, the court attempted
to set forth the principle on which the decision was based. It is first emphasized
that Doctor Falcone's exclusion resulted in a partial divestiture of his state-granted
license.6 ' Such an action was contrary to a statutory expression of the state's public
policy. This test is clear enough, but narrow. It would only invalidate exclusion where
there is a statutory license to practice a profession and where the applicant is barred
because of his exclusion from fully exercising his rights under the license.
Next the court says that it will act in some situations where membership is an
"economic necessity," the requirements of natural justice demand the action, and
the public welfare is served. Acting in such situations, however, the court will be
careful not to impair the legitimate objectives of the society.62 This implies a
broader range of judicial activity. Under such a formulation the courts are no
longer limited by the requirement of a statutory license, but the limitation, however
vague, of economic necessity is yet present.
The final paragraphs of the court's opinion seem to suggest a yet broader cri-
terion for the application of judicial power to voluntary associations. There the
court emphasizes the public interest in the affairs of this association and the power
exercised by it. Such power, says the court, should be used in a fiduciary manner
and if it is not so used it will be subject to judicial reversal.63 These sentences, recast
in general terms, could be used to justify extensive judicial intervention. There is
no talk here of statutory license nor economic necessity nor even of exclusion. Rather
it seems, wherever the public interest is tied up in a voluntary association its actions
must comport with that public interest.
None of these statements by the court are inconsistent and none of them in-
applicable to the case of Doctor Falcone, but each establishes a test of judicial in-
tervention which calls forth different predictions as to its action in future cases.
Whether or not one concurs with the holding here and regardless of one's
judgement upon each of the three grounds of intervention required by the case,
there are certain objections which may be made to the opinion. The court gives
the County Society and other county societies little guidance as to what they must
do in further admission situations to avoid judicial disapproval. There was too
little discussion in this case of j'ast what a society may look into in determining
admission.
A more fundamental objection must be made to the court's failure to consider
any alternative to the relief granted. 4 Conceding that it is clear that plaintiff was
entitled to relief from the economic hardship imposed upon him by the society's
refusal to admit him, it is not so clear that an order compelling admission was the
only or the best relief. All but one of the union cases, it will be remembered, gave
defendant unions the alternative of admitting plaintiffs to membership or not en-
forcing their closed shop against them. It is possible that the adverse effect upon
Falcone could be remedied in no other way than admission 6 5 but to grant this
extraordinary remedy compelling the members of the Society to associate with
61 Id. at 588, 170 A.2d at 795.
62 Id. at 592, 170 A.2d at 796-97.
63 Id. at 597, 170 A.2d at 799.
64 For a similar criticism of the lower court's decision, see Note, 15 RUTGERs L. Rlv.
327 (1961). The analogous distinction between admission to unions and job protection is
discussed in Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in
a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1343 (1961).
65 See note 25 and the accompanying text. It is possible that full relief could not have
been granted in this case by an order against the hospitals, but it is nevertheless submitted
that the court should have discussed this point.
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someone not of their choosing and over their objection that the hospitals .and not
they should be defendants was to decide the case without sufficient consideration of
the alternatives.
. The second ground of the court's intervention, its idea of economic necessity,
is open to objection on grounds of vagueness. Clearly the Order of the Eastern Star
is at one end of a spectrum of necessity and a county medical association near the
other. Arguably, however, there are few organizations extant in our commerical
society membership in which may. not be of economic benefit to some applicants.
It seems unlikely that the court's simple ranging of social, religious and fraternal
organizations on one hand and economic associations on the other will stand the
test of future litigation.66
.Finally, one might take objection to the broad language of the court's last test.
It is easy to say that a voluntary association whose interests conflict with those
of the public should be limited. But the court's use of the phrase "Fiduciary power"
seems unnecessary to the decision and an undesirable analogy subject to future
application which might too severely limit an association's freedom of action."7
The decision in Falcone, despite its sometimes vague and perhaps overly broad
language, is an important and beneficial alteration in both the general law of vol-
untary associations and the particular law of the medical profession. The decision
is a response to an actual need of a society increasingly corporate in structure."8
The recognition by this court that some intervention 'by the judiciary may be neces-
sary apart from the anti-trust laws is a valuable contribution to this area of the
law. Of necessity, such an early recognition leaves open many questions of extent
and theory.
Thomas R. Joyce
WILLS - BANK DEPOSITS - DEPOSIT CERTIFICATES MARKED "P. 0. D."
(PAYABLE ON DEATH) TO A NAMED BENEFICIARY ARE AN INvALD ATTEMPT AT
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION UNLESS THE FoRiALrrEs OF A WILL ARE COm-
PLIED WITH. Decedent had made three bank deposits totalling $8500 and received
in return deposit certificates bearing his name followed by the letters "P. 0. D."
and the names of his two daughters by a previous marriage. Decedent made a
will providing legacies for his daughters by the previous marriage. He specifically
provided that his widow should not share in his estate. His widow elected to take
under the law. She filed exception to the inventory and appraisement of the
estate because the bank deposit certificates were not included. It was agreed by
the parties (the widow and the daughters named as beneficiaries) that "P. 0. D."
meant "payable on death" and that it was decedent's intent that the certificates
should on his death be payable to his two daughters who names followed the
letters "P. 0. D." on the certificates. Held. Widow's exceptions upheld. Adding
words "payable on death" to a certificate of deposit was an invalid testamentary
disposition contrary to the Statute of Wills1 and the certificates of deposit were
to be included in decedent's estate. In re Estate of Atkinson, 175 N.E.2d 548
(Ohio, P. Ct., 1961).
66 For a suggestion that economic interests are not the only ones demanding judicial pro-
tection see, HORN, GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION 173 (1956).
67 This approach is suggested by Professor Chafee's "Living Tree" argument. See note 2
and accompanying text.
68 BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 82 (1954).
1 OHIo kEv. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (Page 1953):
Except oral wills, every last will and testament shall be in writing, but
may be handwritten or typewritten. Such will shall be signed at the end by
the party making it or by some other person in such party's presence and at
his express direction, and be attested and subscribed in the presence of such
party, by two or more competent witnesses, who saw the testator subscribe, or
heard him acknowledge his signature.
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The disposition of bank deposits to recipients other than the depositor's estate
on the death of the depositor has become a source of increased litigation. This
is due to the increasing use of the bank deposit for purposes other than merely
the safekeeping of funds;2 to the various forms which bank deposits take and to
the failure of the courts to adopt realistic, consistent legal theories in regard to
bank deposits.3 Bank deposits used to dispose of relatively small amounts of cash
in a simple and effective manner are becoming more widespread. If correctly
established, they provide a simple and inexpensive way of providing for heirs on
the death of the depositor. They provide the layman a valuable device for mak-
ing testamentary dispositions without the aid of lawyers. Such bank deposits, testa-
mentary in character, have been called "the poor man's will."
4
Generally, bank deposits by which the depositor seeks to give some interest
in the fund to another take one of four forms:
1. Deposit by A for A, in trust for B.
2. A and B jointly.
3. In the name of B.
4. For A, payable on death to B.5
In dealing with these forms the courts have adopted different theories to
explain the results reached. They treat the deposits as trustsO or a hybrid form
of trust - the "tentative trust" ; called in New York the "Totten trust."" An-
other theory adopted is a gift theory, either as a gift inter vivos or a gift causa
mortis.9 A present irrevocable interest to the beneficiary must be conveyed during
the depositor's lifetime for the gift to be effective.' 0 Taking from either property
or contracts law, some courts, depending on the form of the deposit, use theories
of joint tenancy and survivorship." The form of the deposit is not always con-
trolling. The same forms of deposit are sometimes treated under different theories
with different results.'
2
In the present case, the Ohio court did not deal at length with the various
theories by which the bank deposit in question could be characterized. It was
not seriously contended that the bank deposit in this case was a deposit in trust
for the beneficiaries. This is probably because, even if there were a trust, a revoc-
able trust can be successfully challenged by a surviving widow who elects to take
under the law, so that rthe res of the trust is included in decedent's estate.' s It
is not clear from the discussion of the cases cited by the Ohio court on what
possible theory sucl4 a disposition of a bank deposit would be held to pass to the
beneficiary on the death of the depositor. The Ohio cases which support such
a disposition of a bank deposit as in the present case are based on a theory of
joint ownership either by gift or by contract. 1 4 This is true despite the fact that
2 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 58.1, p. 477.
3 39 DicK. L. REv. 37 (1934).
4 53 COLuM. L. Rsv. 103 (1953).
5 Ibid.
6 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 58, p. 477.
7 Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own name as trustee for
another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the
lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will,
until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some un-
equivocal act or declaration such as delivery of the pass book or notice to the
beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revoca-
tion or some act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that
an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the
depositor.
8 Deriving its name from the famous case of Matter of Totten, supra note 7.
9 Nemcek v. Central City Nat'l Bank, 188 Pa. Super. 518, 149 A.2d 533 (1959).
10 Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935).
11 Dudley v. Uptown Nat'l Bank of Moline, 25 Ill. App. 2d 514, 167 N.E.2d. 257 (1960).
12 Butler State Bank v. Duncan, 319.S.W.2d 913 (Mo. App. 1959).
13 Harris v. Harris, 140 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947).
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in Ohio there is no technical joint tenancy as to real or personal property.15 There
can be survivorship by contract, however."s To be effective such a deposit must
vest a present interest in the party named as joint owner or beneficiary. 7 The
basis of the decision in the present case is that there is no present interest con-
veyed; the letters "P. 0. D." are, therefore, clearly testamentary and unless wit-
nessed by two witnesses the bank deposit certificate is invalid to pass any interest
to the named beneficiary.'
The authorities of other jurisdictions are generally in accord with the result
reached by the Ohio court.' 9 The Georgia Supreme Court in Stone v. Guest20
discussed the possibility. of treating the attempted disposition of a bank deposit
as a trust, a gift, or a third party beneficiary contract and rejected all three
theories. Following the famous case of Matter of Totten,21 a trust theory is probably
the easiest to sustain once it is determined that the intention of the testator is
testamentary. 22 It has been suggested that the court adopted the trust theory in
these bank deposit cases to circumvent the Statute of Wills. 23 The trust device,
however, is largely fictional and has not provided uniformity in this area of the
law.24 While there is a tendency in the law to wink at the Statute of Wills when
a depositor attempts to make small cash legacies through a bank deposit, by the
use of a trust theory, such a forthright attempt as in the present case (having the
deposit slips marked. P. 0. D. to a beneficiary) is too baldly in violation of the
Statute of Wills to receive judicial sanction,25 unless there is statutory permission
for such a testamentary bequest.2 6
The result reached in the present case was the correct one considering the
law in Ohio and neighboring jurisdictions. Also, the result is sound in that it
strengthens the socially desirable public policy that prevents a husband from
disinheriting his wife. The result, however, is also unfortunate in that it held
that a bank deposit "P. 0. D." to a beneficiary must be executed with all the
formality of a will in order to be effective. The reason other courts attempt to
disregard the Statute of Wills in such cases is because of the useful nature of bank
deposits to provide an uncomplicated method to make small devises of money.
The P. 0. D. form of deposit is not unusual considering the number of reported
cases in which such deposits were brought into litigation. It is also an acceptable
form for passing title to United States Savings Bonds upon death.2 7 Those
cases, however, are controlled by federal regulations. It has been suggested that
the use of the P. 0. D. designation on bank deposit certificates has increased
because of the layman's familiarity with it in connection with government bonds.23
The result in the present case is unfortunate in that the deposit is attacked
as tc its form. Under the theory of the trust cases, the bank deposit is a device
14 In re Estate of Voegel, 161 N.E.2d 778, appeal dismissed, 169 Ohio St. 237, 158 N.E.2d
893 (1959); Sage v. Flueck 132 Ohio St. 377, 7 N.E.2d 802 (1937); Cleveland Trust Co.
v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926).
15 In re Hutchinson's Estate, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 689 (1929).
16 Ibid.
17 Schmitt v. Schmitt, 39 Ohio. App. 219, 177 N.E. 478 (1928).
18 OHio Rv. CoDe ANN. § 2107.03 (Page 1953).
19 Guest v. Stone, 206 Ga. 239, 56 S.E.2d 247 (1949); Dudley v. Uptown Nat'l Bank of
Moline, 25 Ill. App. 2d 514, 167 N.E.2d 257 (1960); In re Estate of Schultz, 152 N.Y.S.2d
959 (Surr. Ct. 1956) ; Hillie v. Slovenian Say. & Loan Ass'n., 67 Pa. D & C 190 (C.P. 1948).
20 Supra note 19.
21 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
22 Butler State Bank v. Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 913 (1959).
23 53 COLUM. L. REv. 103 (1953).
24 39 Dion. L. Rav. 37 (1934). See In re Holpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 120 (1931).
25 See cases cited note 19 supra.
26 Deist Estate, 75 Pa. D & C 145 (C.P. 1950). But see Hillie v. Slovenian Say. & Loan
Ass'n 67 D & C 190 (Pa. 1948).
27 Harvey v. Rackliffe, 141 Me. 169, 41 A.2d 455 (1945).
28 Dudley v. Uptown Nat'l Bank of Moline, 25 Ill. App. 2d 514, 167, N.E. 2d 257 (1960).
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which a man can use as a will without the required formality of a will. In mak-
ing a bank deposit the depositor in reality fulfills the purposes of the Statute of
Wills. There is the ritualistic act which the Statute requires and there is the evi-
dentiary requisite fulfilled by the deposit certificate.2 9 A person making a deposit
with the intent that it be payable on his death to another generally would give
the act as much deliberation as any other testamentary act By requiring the de-
positor to consult an attorney to determine which form of bank deposit will be
valid to pass an interest to another at his death, the Ohio court fails to recog-
nize ithe desirable effect such a device can have in a person's estate plan. Since
the assistance of a lawyer must be sought to choose the correct form of deposit,
the depositor is better advised to have the attorney draft a will.
Cornelius Collins
29 51 YALE L. J. 1, 38 (1941).
